Antonio Pérez (1599-1649) on Intentional Identity: A Revisionism of Peter Auriol’s Thought

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Abstract

This article studies Antonio Pérez’s revision of Peter Auriol’s intentional identity between the apparent being of a thing-as-cognised and its extramental real being. Pérez’s theory of cognition is clearly in debt with Auriol’s theory of intentionality. As Auriol did, Pérez grounded his account on the logical tool of connotation and on the identity between the intelligible species and the act of cognition. Pérez agrees with Auriol’s theory, affirming an identity of indistinction between the apparent being of the thing-as-cognised and the real being of the extramental thing. However, Pérez does not seem to be fully satisfied with Auriol’s account of cognition and introduces two relevant changes. First, he employs the Suarezian doctrine that every intentional act, while directly aims to an object, virtually or indirectly reflects on itself. As a consequence, he supports an identity between the formal side –i.e. the act of cognition– and the objective side –i.e. the thing-as-cognised–. Second, he provides a definition of the identity of indistinction which is different from that of Auriol. By doing so, Pérez equates the apparent being with a universal form, i.e. the act of cognition as such, characterizing every particular act of cognition as proper to every intelligent being. This indeterminate form, then, can be determined by every possible object.

KEYWORDS: ANTONIO PÉREZ; PETER AURIOL; INTENTIONALITY; THEORY OF COGNITION; APPARENT BEING

Antonio Pérez (1599-1649) sobre la identidad intencional: un revisionismo del pensamiento de Pedro Auréolo

Resumen

Este artículo estudia la revisión que hace Antonio Pérez de la identidad intencional de Pedro Auréolo entre el ser aparente de una cosa como conocida y su ser real.

* I would like to thank the anonymous referees for their useful suggestions and comments. Faults, of course, are mine and mine alone.
Aquinas as well as of many other theologians known as critical of Aquinas. In this way, a philosophical or theological issue was challenged by employing the opinion of Thomas. The first two volumes of Pérez's published works are: (1) De perfectionibus Christi; II. De peccatis; IV. De divina gratia auxiliante; V. De Incarnatione Verbi divini; VI. De virtutibus theologicis; III. De iustificatione impii; (2) De praedestinatione; disp. 5. De scientia Dei; III. De voluntate Dei; IV. De providentia Dei; V. De praedestinatione; VI. De Trinitate; (3) De vitiis et peccatis; II. De divina gratia auxiliante; III. De justificacione impii; IV. De virtutibus theologicis; V. De incarnacione Verbi divini; VI. De perfectionibus Christi. Henceforth, I will refer to these volumes with OP I and OP II respectively, adding the numbers of treatise, disputation, paragraph, and page(s). I shall follow a similar style of reference for the early modern editions of Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza and Francisco Suárez. For a complete overview of Pérez's published and unpublished writings, see Adsuara Varela, 2021.

Early modern scholasticism may be considered as a form of revisionism, focused on medieval philosophical and theological doctrines, of course, but in some respects radical (Schmutz, 2022: 16). The 16th and 17th centuries scholastic thinkers were not, indeed, mere repeaters of what was taught and discussed in European universities during the Middle Ages. They reinterpreted medieval scholastic tradition, often proposing new perspectives and innovative doctrines, which had a significant impact on the early modern philosophy and theology. This historiographical thesis can be supported, for instance, by looking at the Jesuit theologian Antonio Pérez's (1599-1649)1 revision of Peter Auriol's († 1322) doctrine on the intentional identity between the apparent being of a cognised thing and its real being outside the soul. This attention for Auriol by a Spanish Jesuit like Antonio Pérez might seem surprising. Indeed, according to the Ratio Studiorum, first published in 1599, the Jesuits were supposed to follow Thomas Aquinas's philosophy and theology, as well as Aristotle's teachings.2 However, as scholars have already highlighted, these prescriptions in some cases were violated and were applied in different ways, undergoing an evolution.3 Usually, a philosophical or theological issue was challenged by employing the opinion of Aquinas as well as of many other theologians known as critical of Aquinas.4 In this respect, Pérez makes no exceptions.

1 A thorough biographical profile of Antonio Pérez can be found in Adsuara Varela, 2021: 1-294 and, then in Soliani, 2018: 14-18. Other works dealing with some aspects of Pérez's thought are: Agostini, 2016; Schmutz, 2003a and 2003b; Knebel, 2000; Ramselow, 1997. Some important articles on Pérez's doctrines are: Knebel, 1993: 201-208; 1998: 2019-223 and 2003: 231-251; Schmutz, 2003b: 495-526 and 2009: 61-99. Several of Pérez's theological works were published after his death. Many philosophical and theological courses taught by him are contained in a series of manuscripts. Some texts from these manuscripts will be quoted later. The first two volumes of Pérez's published works are: (1) In primam partem D. Thomae tractatus V. Opus posthumum [including: 1. De Deo uno et trine (disp. 1. De Deo uno; disp. 2. De visione Dei; disp. 3. De scientia Dei; disp. 4. De praedestinatione; disp. 5. De voluntate Dei; disp. 6. De Trinitate); II. De scientia Dei; III. De voluntate Dei; IV. De providentia Dei; V. De praedestinatione; VI. De Trinitate; (2) In secontam et tertiam partem D. Thomae tractatus sex [including: 1. De viiitis et peccatis; II. De divina gratia auxiliante; III. De justificacione impii; IV. De virtutibus theologicis; V. De incarnatione Verbi divini; VI. De perfectionibus Christi]. Henceforth, I will refer to these volumes with OP I and OP II respectively, adding the numbers of treatise, disputation, paragraph, and page(s). I shall follow a similar style of reference for the early modern editions of Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza and Francisco Suárez. For a complete overview of Pérez's published and unpublished writings, see Adsuara Varela, 2021.

2 Ratio atque Institutio Studiorum Societatis Iesu: 51-56; 79-86.

3 After the research of Inauen, 1916: 201-237 on Aristotle and Aquinas's place in the Ratio Studiorum, in recent years its genesis and evolution has been studied under different perspectives: pedagogical, philosophical, and historical. See Barlett, 1988; Romano, 2000; Casalini-Mattei, 2016; Casalini, 1995; Sander, 2019. On Aquinas' thought in the first edition of the Ratio studiorum, see also Theiner, 1970; Julia, 1996: 115-130.

4 A classic example of this unfaithfulness to Aquinas is the metaphysical framework, which characterises Francisco Suárez's Disputationes Metaphysicae. For instance, on the crucial problem of the analogy of being, see Salas, 2014: 336-362.
As noticed by Jacob Schmutz (2003a: 371), in Spain, during the 16th century, Peter Auriol was often detected and ridiculed. In the second half of 16th century, at Salamanca, Miguel de Palacio targeted Auriol’s claims on the identity between the species and actio intelligendi (Spruit, 1995: II, 275-276). After a few decades, at Coimbra, Gil Fonseca, alias “Aegidius a Praesentatione” (1539-1626), an important Augustinian theologian, challenged Auriol’s theory of cognition, and criticised the same opinion, defining it as alien[a] a vera Philosophia (Disp. de Beat. 8.1.1.6: 209b). Almost in the middle of the 17th century, when Pérez was teaching at Collegio Romano, the Franciscans Bartolomeo Mastri rejected Auriol’s account of cognition and defended Duns Scotus’s teaching. He holds that, according to Auriol, the “understanding” (intelligere) consists in a passive reception of the intelligible species and the mental word is the cognised object (Disp. in De an. 6.3: 142b and 144a).

However, this is only a part of the story. By studying Mastri’s criticism of Auriol’s theory of the objective being –i.e. the apparent being of a thing-as-cognised– with reference to the distinction of reason, Sven Knebel (2000: 23-24) notes that, despite criticism, inside and outside of the Franciscan order, the influence of Auriol on the 17th century is real, albeit it is hard to trace. According to Knebel, Mastri interprets Auriol as William of Ockham and Walter Chatton did. For Mastri, Auriol’s objective being would be a third realm –between the real being and the being of reason produced by the intellect–, which does not allow to terminate the cognitive act in the real being of a thing, but only to its being known. However, Knebel also emphasises the appreciation of Auriol by some Jesuits like Antonio Pérez, Diego Ruiz de Montoya (1562-1632), Francisco de Oviedo (1602-1651), and the Theatine Zaccaria Pasqualigo († 1664). He also draws attention on Mastri’s consideration of Auriol as the Promptuarium noeticorum, who exerted a peculiar influence on the Jesuit school (schola Jesuitarum) (Mastri, Disp.in Met.6.1.4: 279b).

By contrast, Pérez supports Auriol’s doctrine about the identity of the intelligible species with the act of cognition, reinforcing it –quite surprisingly– with Aquinas’ teaching, and with a reference to the Paduan philosopher Jacopo Zabarella. Before Pérez, Jesuits like Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1503-1575) and Girolamo Fasolo (1567-1639), interpreted Aquinas’s account of cognition as a form of direct realism. According to Hurtado, the mental word produced by the intellect, through its act, is the thing itself as cognised. Like Pérez, Hurtado identifies mental word and act of cognition (Schmutz, 2007: 188-193). Hurtado and Pérez’s theory of cognition might be also considered as an attempt to find a convergence between the authority of Aquinas and Auriol’s gnoseology.

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5 Miguel de Palacio was a secular master who taught at the University on Salamanca in the mid-XVIIIth century (García Sánchez, 1999: 413-441).
6 Gil Fonseca replaced Francisco Suárez on the principal chair of theology (1604-1606) at Coimbra; he was also the master of the Franciscan Luke Wadding (1588-1657), known for his editions of John Duns Scotus’ works (20 volumes in folio, published in 1639).
7 This could be the topic for another article. I only note that Mastri and Belluto discuss many scholastics opinion about cognition and mental verb in their work titled Disputationes ad mentem Scoti in De anima. On Bartolomeo Mastri’s life and works, see Forlivesi, 2002.
8 On this topic, see also Schmutz, 2003b: 513; Ramelow, 1997: 67.
9 This Mastri’s definition of Auriol’s Scriptum is frequently quoted (Knebel, 2006: 428; Renemann, 2006: 413; Andersen, 2016: 284).
10 For instance, Mastri and Belluto consider Aquinas’ view of cognition in direct opposition to Auriol’s one (Disp.in De an. 6.3: 142b). However, Sofia Vanni Rovighi, in one of the first article devoted to Auriol’s theory of esse apparens, writes that Auriol’s doctrine could be considered as “phaenomenological enrichment of the same concepts on which is grounded Aquinas’ theory of cognition” (Vanni Rovighi, 1960a: 679) (translation is mine).
12 For a debate on Thomas Aquinas and direct realism, see Pasnau, 1997: 195-219.
Pérez’s concern in Auriol’s writings and way of thought has been already emphasised by scholars. Pérez always defined Auriol as the sharpest (acutissimus) thinker among philosophers and theologians he had read. This fascination with Auriol can be explained by looking at the years of Pérez’s education in Salamanca (1618-1624), where he studied theology under the guidance of Jesuit masters like Valentin de Herice and Hurtado de Mendoza, both readers and admirers of Auriol’s Commentary on the Sentences (Schmutz, 2003a: 371-372), published between 1596 and 1605, thanks to the Franciscan cardinal Costanzo Torri Boccadifuoco di Sarnano (1531-1595).

This article investigates a particular aspect of Auriol and Pérez’s account of cognition, which is the intentional identity between the appearance and the reality of a thing. According to Auriol, the apparent being (esse apparens), namely the proper being of a thing-as-cognised, and the real being of the thing itself outside the intellect, are two different kinds of being, but the thing is one and the same. Indeed, he claims that the apparent being is only a “diminished” being (ens diminutum) and is called “being” only in a metaphorical sense. While accepting many aspects of Auriol’s theory of cognition, Pérez revises it, introducing the Suarezian doctrine of virtual reflection and a new definition of “identity of indistinction” (identitas indistinctionis) to support a more radical view of the intentional identity between the apparent being of the thing-as-cognised and the real being of the extramental thing.

In order to describe Pérez’s revision of Auriol’s intentional identity, I have organized this article in three parts. In the first part, I shall present some crucial aspects of Pérez’s account of the act of cognition, by clarifying the meaning of the terms used by him as well as his philosophical method, both with references to Hurtado de Mendoza and Auriol. In the second part, I shall consider the Pérezian criticism against Auriol’s theory of intentional identity, by considering some texts belonging to the Scriptum super primum Sententiarum. Finally, I shall propose some brief conclusions.

1.1. Hurtado’s teaching and Auriol’s influence on Pérez

Before introducing Pérez’s account of intentionality, in general, and the act of cognition, in particular, it is necessary to look at the logical approach to intentional acts employed by Hurtado de Mendoza. In his Disputationes de Summulis, Hurtado introduces the scholastic distinction between the “formal concept” (conceptus formalis) and the “objective concept” (conceptus obiectivus). This distinction is well known to scholars, and was popularised at the end of the 16th century by Francisco Suárez’s Disputationes metaphysicae (1597). According to Hurtado, the formal concept stands for the act of cognition which represents the object, while the objective concept is the object inasmuch as it is represented by the cognitive act. Hurtado also draws a distinction between “formal ways of knowing” (modus sciendi formalis), i.e. a set of different kinds of knowledge.

15 For an in-depth analysis of the sources linked to this doctrine and explicitly declared by Pérez, see Soliani, 2018: 46-42.
16 Since a critical edition of Auriol’s Commentary on the Sentences is not yet available, in what follows I will employ some abbreviations referring to different editions of Auriol’s writings: SPS-e = Scriptum super primum Sententiarum - Electronic Scriptum; SPS = Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, edited by E. M. Buytaert between 1952-1956; CPS = Commentarium in primum librum Sententiarum, edited by Costanzo Boccadifuoco da Sarnano in 1596.
18 Hurtado’s Disputationes de Summulis are included in the Disputationes in universam philosophiam a Summulis ad Metaphysicam (first edition: Valladolid, 1615). The Disputationes are the result of a three-year philosophical course held in Pamplona between 1606 and 1609. In more detail, the Disputationes de Summulis date back to a course of logic held in Pamplona in the academic year 1606-1607. On Hurtado, see also Schmutz, 2003a: 623-626.
19 Francisco Suárez, DM II.1.1: 16-16a.
cognitive acts by which the intellect defines, distinguishes or argues, and “objective ways of knowing” (modus sciendi objectivus), which are the objects as cognised. Furthermore, every cognised object has corresponding formal ways of knowing (DS I.5: 74b). Hurtado argues that, from a logical perspective, the act of cognition always denominates something, constituting it as an objective way of knowing. This denominative capacity is manifested by linguistic terms like “genus”, “specific difference”, “premise”, “conclusion”, and so on. At the same time, every objective way of knowing denominates its corresponding formal way of knowing. In conclusion, for Hurtado, logicians cannot analyse a formal way of knowing without a reference to the objective one, and vice versa. As a consequence of this correlation between a formal and an objective side of cognition, Hurtado holds that the adequate object of logic is both the act of cognition and the thing (res) insofar as it is cognised, as well as the formal ways of knowing and the objective ways of knowing. However, these two aforementioned sides of cognition play two different roles. The act of cognition, indeed, is conceived by Hurtado like a formal reason which constitutes and denominates (ratio formalis constituens et denominans) the cognised thing (objectivum). By contrast, the cognised thing is like a matter (materia) and a subject (subiectum) which is constituted and determined by the cognitive act.20 As already noticed by scholars, this logical perspective resorting to denominative terms in order to describe the intentional act can be explained by the influence on Hurtado’s thought of nominalism and the so-called Auriol’s conceptualism (Schmutz, 2003a: 301-302).21

Denominative terms represent a recurring topic in early modern scholastic treatises on logic. Indeed, at the beginning of Aristotle’sCategoriae we can find a definition of paronym terms (παρώνυμα), which medieval scholastics called denominativa. Two paronym terms, i.e. a noun and its corresponding adjective, denote concrete objects, which (1) derive their denomination from an abstract term; (2) differ from each other in the desinence or case (πτῶσις); and (3) have in common the same linguistic root.22 The Aristotelian account on paronyms is not fully accepted by Hurtado. He argues that there is a real difference, and not only a grammatical one, between a denominative term like “white” (album) and its denominating form, i.e. “whiteness” (albedo) (DS I.5: 143b). Furthermore, Hurtado applies the theory of denomination to the acts of seeing, love, cognition and other intentional acts, distinguishing between extrinsic and intrinsic denominations. Denominative terms, such as “seen” (visum), “loved” (amatum) or “cognised” (cognitum), when assigned to an extramental thing, are extrinsic denominations, caused by an external denominating form, i.e. respectively, the act of seeing, love, or cognition. By contrast, denominative terms, such as “seeing”, “loving” or “cognising”, are intrinsic denominations due to the same denominating form which originates in the human subject insofar as he is seeing, loving, or cognising (DS I.6: 144b).

According to Hurtado, an intentional act, arising from a human subject, is able to generate some denominations, subsequently studied by logicians. By contrast, the “science of the soul” (animastica) considers intentional acts in their proper nature, as well as their vitality, certainty, truth, and relationship with an active power (potentia vitalis), like intellect and free will (DS I.5.34: 77b). Narrowing the focus on the act of cognition, in Hurtado’s view, logic is concerned with the “being cognised” (esse cognitum), namely “that which is an intellectual object”. Hurtado clarifies that an objective way of knowing can be analysed under three different perspectives: (a) according to itself (secundum se), (b) according to its attributes and predicates, or (c) according to an

20 By considering these premises, Hurtado explains that the formal object of logic is the essence of the two ways of knowing just examined (DS I.5: 86b and 77b).
21 On Hurtado nominalism, see also Caruso, 1979.
22 See Aristoteles, Cat 1.14 12-15; Hurtado de Mendoza, DS IX.2.5: 143a.
extrinsic reason (extrinseca ratio), by which some logical entities, like “genus”, “species”, “subject”, and “predicate”, can be called objects. This third perspective is that proper to logic. For Hurtado, an objective way of knowing formally takes its name from an act of cognition. Indeed, “being an object of the intellect (esse objectum intellectus) and “being cognised” (esse cognitum) are formally the same property, because that which is cognised receives its being from a cognitive act and, thus, the property of “being an object” (DS I.5.26: 74b-75a). The act of cognition objectifies the extramental thing, constituting the “being cognised” of the latter. However, as seen above, the formal way of knowing and the objective way of knowing are two inseparable and correlative entities, constituting a sort of intentional synolon of form and matter. In 1624, in a new edition of the Disputationes de Summulis, Hurtado argues that the aforementioned extrinsic denominations, studied by logicians, are real and cannot be distinguished by their corresponding cognitive act. For this very reason, the proper object of logic is the “real being” (ens reale) and not a mere “being of reason” (ens rationis). Indeed, the cognitive act is real, and cannot be separated from the extrinsic denomination, which is assigned to the extramental thing. Similarly, the term “cognising”, referred to an intrinsic denomination and attributed to the intelligent subject, is also real. Hurtado explains this point, affirming that the intentional act, conceived as a “denominating form” (forma denominans), is a real being, which immediately constitutes something in a particular kind of being, i.e. the cognised being (Log. I.4.4.72, 56a).

Like Hurtado, his pupil Antonio Pérez describes the intentional act as a denominating form and conceives the act of cognition and the cognised object as two connotative terms. He claims that his own method is not a novelty, but the same followed in De anima III and Ethica Nichomachea, where Aristotle explains his view on the intentional acts (OP II IV.4.7.1.3: 282a). In order to clarify his position, Pérez resorts to paronyms, through an analysis of the relationship between concrete and abstract terms. A concrete term can signify three different items: (1) what possesses a form (habens); (2) what is possessed (habitus), i.e. the form itself; and (3) the possession (habito) of a form, which is a middle term expressing a union between the first and the second item (OP II IV.7.1.9: 282b). To be more precise, (1) and (2) are concrete terms, while (3) is an abstract term. However, the meaning of (3) can be only elucidated through a reference to the first or the second item. Pérez applies this logical doctrine to the intentional act starting from the act of seeing, because, according to a common Aristotelian view, things which can be sensed (sensibilia) and the act of seeing are the best known for a human being. He claims that in order to elaborate an instant definition of “the act of seeing whiteness” (visio albedinis), we can start from two different entities, which are (1) “the human subject seeing whiteness” (videns albedinem) and (2) “the whiteness seen” (albedo visa). In the first case, we can define “the act of seeing” (visio) as an abstract notion (notio) referring to the seeing subject. By contrast, in the second case, a definition of the act of seeing is referred to the whiteness seen. Pérez argues that both definitions signify the same thing, i.e. the act of seeing whiteness. However, there is a distinction of reason between the act of seeing and the seeing subject, given that the former is the abstract concept denominating the latter. The same kind of distinction takes place between the act of seeing and the whiteness seen. These two distinctions of reason are due to the connotative nature of the two

23 Pérez, Tractatus de existentia et attributis divinis, I.1: f. 1v: “nobis sensibilia sunt primo nota”. On this manuscript, see Lilao Francisca-Castrillo González, 1997: 1, 453. On the geoselenological priority of sight, see Pérez, OP II IV.7.1.4: 282a. See e.g. Aristoteles, Ana. Post. I.2.72a 1-5; Met. IV.11.1016b 28-34. Pérez’s Tractatus de existentia et attributis divinis contains the course held in the academic year 1640-1641 at Salamanca. The course deals with many issues concerning the existence and unity of God, with reference to the possibility of introducing a distinction between the divine essence and the divine attributes, as well as between God and his free acts. The issues addressed in this manuscript are partially similar to the first disputation, titled De Deo uno and published with many other disputations in the Opus posthumum (Rome 1656, see n. 1). This disputation is included inside the manuscript titled Tractatus de Deorete et uno R.P. Antonii Pérez. On the title page is also written: “Firmi, Rome 1648-1656”. The text of the manuscript is different from its published version, which is often affected by errors, typos, and sometimes long textual omissions. See my remarks, available here: https://archiviopug.org/2016/01/15/antonio-Pérez-1599-1649-theologus-mirabilis-di-gian-pietro-sollani/.
concrete entities, i.e. the seeing subject and the whiteness seen. As pointed out by Alain De Libera (1999: 357), this overlap between the field covered by the paronymy and that of connotation is a *geste théorétique* performed by Ockham (Ord. I.2.9: 14-17) and his successors. More in detail, according to Ockham, connotative terms are a class of denotative terms (Pellettier, 2012: 168). Peter Auriol also made a wide use of connotation to explain his view about the cognitive act. He argues that a connotative term has always a double meaning. It directly (*in recto*) signifies something and indirectly co-signifies (*in obliquo*) another thing. By applying this doctrine to the being cognised, i.e. the apparent being, Auriol argues, followed by Pérez, that “understanding” (*intelligere*) formally means a determinate connotation (*determinatum connotatum*), namely “having present something as something which appears”. Like Pérez, he explicitly employs the aforementioned term *habito* to define the formal reason of intellection as a possession of something according to the mode of that which appears under the way of the spiritual appearance (*SPS-e* 35.1.1: 8.402-403). In other words, the abstract term “understanding” always means a direct reference to a concrete object insofar as it is cognised, but also a direct reference to a cognising subject (*SPS-e* 35.1.1: 7.353-354). However, subject and object cannot be grasped without an indirect reference to “understanding”, namely to an act of cognition.

Pérez also emphasises the strong bond between the abstract concept and the concrete one, claiming that every abstract needs the existence of its corresponding concrete (OP II VI.2.4.17: 487a). He argues that the act of seeing, for instance, has a structure consisting of a seeing subject and an object seen, both directly denominated by the act itself and predicated *in recto*, while the act is a constitutive and denominating form, predicated *in obliquo* (OP II IV.7.1.7: 282a).27 According to Pérez, the easiest way – and the closest to daily experience – to conceive the meaning of a concrete term, such as “white”, is to define it as “an entity which possesses whiteness, which denominates and makes something white”. Here, whiteness is signified by the concrete term “white” *in obliquo* and *confuse*. If the meaning of the term “whiteness” were unknown, then the following definition of the term “white” would be “an entity which possesses that by which it is named and constituted white”. Similarly, a human being who ignored the term “whiteness” could give this definition: “whiteness is that whose possession makes something white”.28 The relationship between “whiteness” and “white” is like the relationship, described above, between an abstract concept and a concrete one.

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24 Pérez, OP II IV.7.1.7: 282a: “Ex his ergo iam patet cum habeamus notionem videntis albedinum et albedinum visae, facili- nam esse visionis albedinis definitionem, quae duplex fieri potest. Altera qua visionem ut abstractum videntis albedinum explicamus, altera qua ut abstractum albedinum visae. Utraque eandem rem significat, sed tamen visio distinctiur ratione, ut est abstractum videntis albedinum, et a seipso [sic] ut est abstractum albedinum visae, ob distinctas concretorum connotations. Probable seipsa should be read as reipsa. See also OP II IV.7.1.7: 282a: “Quia ergo albedo v.g. a me videtur, albedo determinatur visae, et ego videns albedinem. Quid autem sit albedinem esse visum, et me esse videntem albedinem, sumendum est tanquam principium per se notum, omnes enim homines praeter coecos habent suis mentibus impressam notionem videntis albedinem, postquam eam viderunt, et etiam albedinum ut visae notionem, qua albedinem ut ita denomi- natam, ex proprio notitia concipiunt, et ab omnibus aliis discernunt”.

25 The importance of connotation to better understand Auriol’s account of cognition has been recently emphasised by Fornasieri, 2021a; 2021b.

26 Petrus Aureolus, *SPS-e* 35.1.7: 316-321: “Quid dicendum secundum veritatem. Et primo quod intelligere formaliter dicit determinatum connotatum, scilicet habere praesens aliquid ut apparens; non dicit autem determinare aliquid in recto, contra opiniones omnes. Respt igniger nunc dicere quod videtur sub quadruplici propositione, ex qua eliicet quina intima principaliter. Prima siquidem est quod intelligere formaliter non includit determinare aliquid in recto, sed solum connotat aliquid ut apparens illud quod dicitur intelligere”.

27 What is predicated in *recto* is directly predicated or predicated in the nominative case because it is the subject of a proposition. On the contrary, what is predicated *in obliquo* is indirectly predicated or predicated in a case other than nominative.

28 Pérez, OP II IV.7.1.5: 282a: “Sed praeterea qui concretum hab resapicci notionem concept, ut est experimentis notissimum et omnium gentium usu probatum, potest illam per duas notiones resolvere et exponere quibus clarius totum percipiat concre- tum et id quod in obliquo significabit tanquam habitum, sed confuse tamen et indistincte a subiecto se habente iam seorsim et abstracte propria notione designet nomen quod illi propositum aut inventit aut inventum attribuat: quid enim facilius homini habenti iam seorsim, et abstracte propria notione designet, nomenquelle illi propositum aut inventit, aut inventum attribuat: quid enim facilius homini habenti notionem simplicem alibi, quam dicere, Album est, quod habet albedinem, quia ipsum denominat, et reddit album: seu si nuncam audiret illam vocem albedo [...] licere poterit, Album est, quod habet id a quo denominat et constituit album: et huic ignorant vocem albedo, etiam albedo est, quam quis habens, est albus per ipsam”.
The former is obtained through an act of abstraction by the latter, and logicians call it with a different term, such as “form”, “act”, and “quality” of the concrete concept. If things are signified in a natural and proper way, then the concrete concept refers to a physical subject possessing (habens) a form, which is possessed by the subject and named with an abstract term. Similarly, if things are signified in an artificial and improper way, then that which possesses the form is considered like a concrete subject –albeit it is not a physical subject–, and the form is that which is possessed (OP II IV.7.1.6: 282a).

Returning to the example of the act of seeing, the object seen is named by Pérez “objective concrete” (concretum objectivum), and is the most known quaod nos, because it is closer to senses. By contrast, the concrete entity composed by the seeing subject and the act of seeing cannot be grasped by the senses. The “seeing subject” can be directly (in recto) conceived only by the intellect, which grasps the substance of the seeing person, while the objective concrete –i.e. the object-as-seen– can only be sensed (OPII IV.7.1.10: 282b-283a). In fact, according to Pérez, only the object can be directly sensed, while the act of seeing is indirectly sensed through an act of virtual reflection (reflexio virtualis) (OP II IV.7.2.1: 285a). Virtual reflection may be understood as a sort of prereflexive capacity, which Pérez considers essential to every intentional act. He clarifies that every intentional act, albeit directly addressing an object, can indirectly or virtually aim to itself. The intentional object, indeed, is constituted by the intentional act itself. For this very reason, the intentional act can aim to its object as long as it virtually addresses itself. As will be seen below, virtual reflection supports an idea of intentional identity, which is consequently at the heart of Pérez’s criticism of Auriol’s doctrine of intentionality. Pérez’s view on the correlation between the act and the thing-as-cognised can be expressed in the following way: on the one hand, the object cannot be cognised without a reference, albeit indirect, to the intentional act and, on the other, a reflection on the intentional act always involves a reference to the intentional object (OP II IV.7.1.11: 283a).

Pérez considers virtual reflection as an implicit teaching included in De anima II.4.415a 14-23. Here, Aristotle argues that the intentional acts belonging to a power of the soul can be known only through its proper objects. In fact, he interprets this Aristotelian teaching through the abstract-concrete relationship briefly presented above. By considering the case of the act of cognition, Pérez states that the objective concrete is the best known (notissimum) for us. When the intellect grasps this concrete, it also cognises the intentional act –i.e. the abstract one–, which constitutes the object as a cognised object (OP II IV.7.1.12: 283a).

According to Pérez, virtual reflection also allows to distinguish the different ways of knowing (modum cognoscendi), which characterise a particular science (OP II IV.3.1.18: 222b). Indeed, Pérez’s theory of virtual reflection also intersects the Aristotelian doctrine, which assigns one most formal object (obiectum formalissimum) to each intentional power, in order to specify and distinguish a power from another (OP II IV.3.6.1.13: 283a). The most formal object of an intentional power is the most general aspect which is common to every singular object and can be aimed by a given intentional power. According to

29 The doctrine of virtual reflection is a direct influence of Suarez on Pérez’s thought. It is often distinguished from formal reflection, which consists in a direct reflection of the act on itself (OP II IV.7.2.1: 285a). Pérez also refers to his Scholastic sources, such as Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas –albeit the expression “reflexio virtualis” does not seem to be traceable in the medieval Scholasticism. On Augustinian, medieval and Suarezian roots of Pérez’s virtual reflection, see Soliani, 2018: 46-59. On the concept of virtual reflection in the 17th century Scholasticism, see Knebel, 2016: 57-88. According to him, Pérez was a key figure, who coordinated two different conceptions of virtual reflection. The first one is present in the Jesuit theologian Francisco Amico (1578-1651) who describes virtual reflection as a series of infinite reflexive cognitions (DeDeo 12.9: 192b). The second conception goes back to the Augustinian theologian Gil Fonseca, who argues in favour of a prereflexive dimension of the act of apprehension (Disp. de Beat. VI6.6.9: 579b). The originality of Pérez’s virtual reflection consists in a more extended application of this concept to all intentional acts.
Pérez, even the most formal object of an intentional power is constituted by the act of the power itself, taken in a general way and called *ratio formalissima sub qua*. For instance, the most formal object of the act of seeing is different from any other formal object pertaining to any other intentional power. Now, the intentional object is constituted by the act of seeing itself and, at the same time, specifies its corresponding intentional power and allows to distinguish a power from another. The most formal object of the act of seeing is a concrete constituted by an abstract entity, which is the act itself and is called *ratio formalissima sub qua objectiva*. As a consequence, a *ratio objectiva* constituting an intentional object – *formalissima sub qua* or not – is not an object, but the intentional act itself (OP II IV.3.6.1.13: 283a). This doctrine clearly seems to be an attempt to harmonise Aristotle with Auriol. Indeed, unlike Pérez, Auriol does not accept Aristotle’s claim that powers of the soul can be distinguished thanks to the objects grasped by their acts. According to Auriol, powers differ in virtue of the way in which they grasp their objects, namely thanks to the mode in which the objects appear (*modus apparendi*). Indeed, he argues that what can be grasped by the senses can be also caught by imagination and intellect. The same remark goes for the objects of imagination, which can be also grasped by the intellect (SPS-e, 35.1.1: 8.382-385). By contrast, in Pérez’s view, the way of appearing, i.e. the intentional act, is an essential component of the cognised object and, thus, Aristotle and Auriol’s claims are not really opposed.

According to Pérez, in addition to the intentional act taken in a broader sense, also the powers of the soul, dispositions (*habitus*), and the intelligible species may be called *rationes formalissimae sub quibus*, because they can denominate an object and, therefore, participate in the formal nature proper of the intentional act. In more detail, the cognitive power, the scientific disposition, and the intelligible species are, like the act of cognition, *rationes* which can equally assign denominations belonging to the genus “cognizable” (*cognoscibilis*). When an object is extrinsically denominated by these *rationes*, it can also be called “the most formal” (*formalissimum*), but not in an absolute sense (*non absolute*). Indeed, according to Pérez, only the objective concrete composed by the most formal object and the intentional act should be considered as the most formal object in a proper sense (OP II IV.7.1.14: 283a-b).

### 1.2. The two sides of cognition

The act of cognition has the same connotative structure as that of any other intentional act. According to Pérez, its *ratio formalissima sub qua objectiva* – i.e. as seen above, the cognitive act itself –, can be called, with Auriol’s vocabulary, “apparent being” (*esse apparens*), or also “the being of the cognised” (*esse cogniti*). In his Commentary on the Sentences, Auriol writes that the formal reason of “understanding” (*intelligere*), or “cognising” (*cognoscere*), taken in a universal sense, is nothing but “having something present to the intellect in an apparent way (*per modum apparentis*)”. According to Auriol and Pérez, the apparent being of that which is cognised is a logical and completely immaterial being, which Silvestro Mauro – a Pérez’s pupil at Collegio Romano – will conceive as a result of the more elevated grade of abstraction (Doyle, 2013: 181). Like Auriol, Pérez also claims that the cognising subject gives the cognised object: “the intentional being” (*esse intentionale*) (OP I I.2.22: 5a). However, it should be noted that “the being of the cognised”, i.e. “apparent being”, is not always synonymous with the more common scholastic syntagma “the being cognised” (*esse cognitum*). Pérez seems to employ two different meanings of *esse cognitum*, which

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30 See, also Petrus Aureolus, SPS Prooem.2: 204.104. On this topic, see Lécka, 2016: 52.
31 Petrus Aureolus, SPS e 35.1.1: 7.332-333: “apparet quod non est plus de formali ratione ipsius intelligere, aut cognoscere in universali, nisi habere aliquid praesens per modum apparentis”. See also Friedmann, 2015: 146.
32 A synonymus of *esse cognitum* is *esse apparenti* (SPS e 35.1.1: 8.379-381; SPS e 12.588-589; SPS e 13.654-656). As we shall see below, in Pérez’s writings we can find also the syntagma *esse intellectu*. 
can probably be traced back to Suárez. First, “being cognised” may mean “what is intentionally present” (OP II I.1.7: 223a) as a result of an extrinsic denomination received by the act of cognition. Second, “being cognised” can be taken as the being a thing has, inasmuch as it is cognised.33 “The being cognised” and “the being of the cognised” seems to be synonymous only according to the second meaning. In this respect, according to Pérez, they are also synonymous with “apparent being”. Since according to Auriol and Pérez, this being is only a logical being due to an extrinsic denomination and connotation, that which belongs to the apparent being does not represent another field of being, but the same being of the extramental things, in so far as they are cognised, i.e. they appear.

In Pérez’s view, “the being of the cognised” seems to be as a genus including every cognised object and specified by several ways of knowing, with their specific formal objects. More in detail, Pérez draws the following distinctions—clearly rooted in Aristotelian and medieval tradition—between different acts of cognition, which are: (1) “simple apprehension” (apprehension simplex), subdivided into (1a) “intuitive cognition” (cognitio intuitiva) and (1b) “quidditative cognition” (cognitio quidditativa); and (2) “judgement” (cognitio assensiva seu iudicativa). The formal object of intuitive cognition is always something physically seen, while the formal object of the quidditative cognition is something clearly cognised in its very essence, regardless of the actual existence of the object (OP II IV.7.6.45: 236a). Intuitive cognition is made possible by the physical presence, which depends by the durability (duratio) in time of the extramental thing. In brief, an act of intuitive cognition makes the physical presence of the thing similar to its intentional presence in the intellect (OP II IV.3.1.7: 256a; OP I IV.4.4.47: 340a). On this point, Pérez disagrees with Scotus and Ockham. He argues that only the act of sensation can “intuitively see its objects […], while the created intellect cannot intuitively see its individual and intelligible objects”.34 By contrast, quidditative cognition is the most perfect apprehension: the physical presence (or actual existence) of the object is not required, unless this object is God, whose essence coincides with his existence (OP II IV.3.9.45: 253a). Finally, judgement is the most perfect form of cognition and its formal object is something known in several ways: (1) through an act of assent; (2) as a cause of the assent; (3) thanks to an immediate influx of the object of assent; or finally (4) through a discourse, at least virtual (OP II IV.3.6.46: 238). Pérez claims that the act of judgement is a “locution” (locutio) and the only act of cognition in a proper sense. Apprehension, indeed, should be understood as a matter for a judgement.

This is a sort of cognitive hierarchy that includes every kind of human cognitive act; but, from a psychological point of view, what does “cognising” or “understanding” means? Medieval and early modern scholastics were used to discuss many aspects of human cognition within treatises devoted to theological dogmas, such as the trinitarian nature of God (OP I IV.3.36: 312b) or the beatific vision in heaven. In this respect, Pérez makes no exception. However, at the beginning of his career, he also wrote a course on De anima, unfortunately lost so far. Nevertheless, Pérez’s theological treatises include many remarks and digressions on some gnoseological issues, and, through them, we can get an idea of his complex theory of cognition. In his course De scientia Dei, Pérez states that the cognising subject (intelligens), through cognition, “makes”,

33 For this distinction in Suárez, see Doyle, 2013: 25. On the different interpretations of Suárez esse cognitum with reference to his metaphysical framework, see Salas, 2022: 66-68.

34 Pérez, Tractatus de Deo trino et uno 11.2.7. II. 194-195: “Sensus potest videere intuitivum singula sua objecta […], et tamen non potent intellectus creatus videere intuitivum singula sua objecta intelligibilia”. See also Pérez, OP II II.2.111: 43a. Unlike Scotus, Pérez denies the possibility of a natural intuitions of God (Duns Scotus, Rep. Par. Prologus 3.2: 223). An in-depth analysis of this medieval discussion and its early modern Scholastic revival can be found in Scribano 2006: 68-118. See also Ockham, Ord. 1.3.6: 492 and 494.
“says”, “forms”, and “really produces” a “mental word” (verbum). This definition firstly concerns the generation of the Divine Word by God the Father and, by analogy, with the human cognition – albeit, in this second case, Pérez admits a “true and real relation” between the created cognisor and the object cognised. By contrast, a real relation between the divine intellect and his object is impossible. Indeed, the object cognised could be only a creature or God itself. Pérez argues that the common theological opinion excludes the possibility of a real relation between God and his creatures, otherwise the former would be dependent on the existence of the latter. Furthermore, we should also avoid the second possibility, because God cannot have a real relation with Himself.

Pérez also specifies his definition of “understanding”:

Intelligere esse habere virtualiter formam qua objectum reddatur intellectum. Objectum autem reddi intellectum est produci in esse repraesentator per productionem formae repraesentantis aut saltem per productionem reale praedicati identificati cum ipsa forma repraesentante. (OP I VI.3.4.45: 488b)

“Understanding” means virtually possessing a form for which an object is made understood. Making understood an object means to really produce it in a representative being through a production of a representing form or, at least through a real production of a predicate identified with the same representing form. (OP I VI.3.4.45: 488b)

Following once again Auriol’s vocabulary, Pérez clarifies that constituting the object in the “being of the understood” (esse intellecti) means making it actively present, or giving it an “appearance”, “visible” or “seen” being, i.e. an “intellegible being” (esse intelligibile). Like Auriol’s theory of cognition, the Pérezian doctrine entails that the act of cognition consists of two different aspects: (1) an active and subjective side, i.e. the act itself coinciding with the intelligent nature of the subject, and (2) a passive and objective one (cognition obiectiva and quasi passiva), that is a mental word. Pérez calls it “cognition in the being produced” (cognition in esse producitur), by which the extramental thing receives several denominations, such as “cognised”, or “known” (ibid.).

Unlike the divine act of cognition, which is absolute and coincides with God himself, the human intellect really produces a distinct act of cognition (OP I VI.3.4.46: 488b). The act of cognition is considered like an accidental and representing form or quality, actively relating the cognisor and the object cognised. This representational power

35 Pérez, DSD I.2.9: f. 3v: “De ratione intelligentis est, ut per cognitionem, qua intelligit, formet verbum. Formatio autem verbi et eiusmodium actus reaalis verbi: Also, Pérez, OP I.2.9: 111b. On this definition see also Pérez, DSD I.7.106: f. 33v; OP I.7.106: 127b; OP I VI.3.4.45: 488b. Unlike the published version of the D S D (see OP I VI.), which is full of errors, the manuscript version is trustworthy.

36 Pérez, De scientia Dei I.2.11: f. 6v: “Teria difficulitas est objecti intellecti ad intelligentem et intelligentis ad objectum intellectum esse verum et realem relationem. At fieri non potest Deum referri relatione reali ad objectum intellectus. See also, Pérez, OP I 1.2.11:111b-112a. Auriol’s application of psychological concepts to the explanation of the trinitarian dogma is already studied by Friedman, 1997.

37 Pérez, De scientia Dei I.2.11: f. 6v: “Nam vel illud est creatura et communior veriorque Theologorum sententia docet Deum ad creaturam non referri relatione reali ad objectum intellectus. See also Pérez, OP I 1.2.11:111b-112a. Auriol’s application of psychological concepts to the explanation of the trinitarian dogma is already studied by Friedman, 1997.

38 See also Pérez, De scientia Dei I.2.9: f. 39v: “Quare hoc ignitar a te, quo sensu verum sit verbum pertinere ad genus cognitiorum atque cognitionis? Sunt enim in eadem lineis et sese cognitio et contrae, ut dicamus verbum esse ipsum cognitio- nem obiectivam et quasi passivam seu cognitionem in esse producta a qua objectum denominatur intellectum et constitu- tum in esse apparentis et conspici et praesens intellectu divino terminantisque obiective habituidinem intelligentis”. Here, the emphasis is on the divine intellect, but the conceptual framework is the same for a human intellect as well. See also, Pérez, OP I.7.99: 125b. On the “passive conception”, e.g. Petrus Aureolus, SPS 23: “Objectiva concepto passiva dicit non respicere rem per modum substanti, immo res quae conceptur est aliquid sui et immiscere indistinctaequibili sibi. Unde conceptum rosae idem est quod rosa, et conceptus animalis idem quod animal. Iste nimium conceptus claudit indistincta- liter realitates omnium particularium animalium et quendam modum essendi, qui est intentionalis, qui non est alii quam passiva concepto” (ed. Perler, 1905b: 248).
of cognition manifests the immanent and intrinsic vitality of the intelligent nature.\footnote{Pérez, De scientia Dei I.7.106: f. 33r: “Sicut etiam in intelligente creato forma est ipsa qualitas representativa et tamen includit actionem tamquam habitudinem ratione cuius intelligens illam habet formam non solum passiva, sed immanenter et vitaliter, atque ab intrinsecō. See also Pérez, OP I 1.7.106a: 125b. Scotus was probably the first medieval thinker who considered the human act of cognition as an accidental quality inherent to the human intellect (Duns Scotus, Ord. I 1.3.3: 537, 320-321).} However, on this point, Pérez's thought could seem inconsistent. He supports the identity between the intelligent nature and its act, but at other times he distinguishes the former and the latter. We should distinguish two different levels inside Pérez's doctrine. First, during cognitive process, the cognisor and its cognitive act cannot be separated and are one and the same entity. Nevertheless, the act of cognition has its source in the human cognisor and, thus, is ontologically different from the intelligent nature—as an accident is different from a substance. Pérez calls “formal cognition” (\textit{formalis cognitio} or \textit{formalis intellectio}) the act of cognition—i.e. the representing or denominative form—identifying it with the predicate “being produced in the represented being”, assigned to the object-as-cognised. By contrast, the cognised object is called \textit{cognitio obiectiva} (ibid.). This distinction clearly recalls in its proper meaning Auriol's distinction between \textit{conceptus obiectalis} (or \textit{objectivus}) and \textit{conceptus formalis}. The former is nothing but the thing, inasmuch as it objectively appears thanks to a cognitive act, which is its corresponding formal concept (\textit{SPS-e} 27.2.2: 20.740-742; See also Petrus Aureolus, \textit{In Sent.} II.9.2: 109a).\footnote{See on this topic, Forlivesi, 2002: 11-12. Auriol's \textit{apparent being} is partially edited in a provisional form by Carlo Giacon (1900-1984), Gustavo Bontadini (1903-1990), and Sofía Vanni Rovighi (1908-1990) as well. The starting point of this debate on the meaning of phenomenalism can be found in \textit{Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica} 32.4 (1942).} We should clearly avoid a representationalist interpretation of both Pérez and Auriol's syntagma \textit{esse repraesentati}. Indeed, Pérez employs the term “represented” as synonymous with “apparent”, “seen”, “intelligible”, “cognised” and so on, just as according to Auriol's theory. The intentional representation of an extramental thing is, in fact, nothing but the thing itself insofar as it is intentionally present and appears to cognisor's intellect.\footnote{An instructive discussion of this point can be found in Perler, 1994a: 84-87.}

2. Pérez and Auriol on Intentional Identity

By addressing the issue of the generation of the Divine Word in his treatise \textit{De Sacrosancta Trinitate}, Pérez makes the claim that, for Auriol, there would be a distinction “on the side of the thing” (\textit{a parte rei}), placed in the human intellect, between the formal cognition and the objective one (\textit{OP I} V1.3.3.47: 489a). Pérez generically refers to some excerpts (\textit{passim}) belonging to the Book 1 of the \textit{Commentary on the Sentences}. However, he supports his interpretation by noting that Auriol calls “being of reason” (\textit{ens rationis}) the passive cognition—i.e. the cognised being, or the objective cognition—, and considers it on the side of the object. As a matter of fact, Auriol considers the apparent being of a thing as a “diminished and a metaphorical” (\textit{diminite et metaphorice}) being, while assigning real being (\textit{esse simpliciter}) to the extramental thing.\footnote{The representationalist interpretation of Auriol's theory of cognition and perception has recently been criticised by Chris Schabel and Russell Friedam.} Pérez also notes that Auriol's apparent being always appears together with the cognised object, albeit thanks to an imperfect kind of “intentional identity”, also called “identity of
indistinction“ (OP I, VI, 3, 47: 489a).43 The intentional identity is a consequence of the identity between the being of reason and the passive cognition as such, namely that which Auriol also calls the “being produced in the apparent being”. This being of reason or passive cognition always needs to be determined by a specific object, without which it cannot appear, and vice versa (ibid.). This interpretation deserves a comparison with Auriol's texts. In his Commentary on the Sentences, Auriol wrote:

Conceptus rosae, licet non sit purum concipi, immo cum hoc est rosa, resolvit tamen non potest in realitatem rosae et ipsum concipi tamquam in duo, immo conceptus rosae obiicitur tamquam quid simplicissimum, et impossibile separari in duo. Et eodem modo Verbum in divinis, quod includit concipi seu generari passive et cum hoc divinam essentiam, resolvit non potest per aliquem intellectum in generari et essentiam, immo est quid simplicissimum propter unitatem indistinctionis omnimoae, quae tanta est realiter in conceptu divino, quanta est intentionaliter in conceptu rosae ab intellectu nostro formato. (SPS-e 9.1: 11.481-488)

The concept of the rose, although it is not merely conceived –or, rather, it is the rose with this “conceived being”, indeed, cannot be divided into the reality of the rose and the conceived being, as if they were two [different items]. On the contrary, the concept of the rose offers itself as something extremely simple and impossible to be separated in two [items]. Similarly, the Divine Word –who includes the conceived being or the passively generated being and, with this one, the divine essence–, cannot be subdivided by means of the intellect in the divine essence and the generated being. On the contrary, [the Word] is something extremely simple, because of the unity of indistinction in all respects, both really in the divine concept and intentionally in the rose as a concept formed by our intellect. (SPS-e 9.1: 11.481-488)

According to Auriol, the thing-as-conceived and the extramental thing are not two separable things. The concept of the thing is “simple”. In other words, the thing inasmuch as it is conceived and the extramental thing are the same thing, thanks to a particular kind of intentional unity, called by Auriol “unity of indistinction in all respects”. Pérez explicitly accepts this theory, and as seen above, many other aspects of Auriol's account of intentionality. He also admits the presence of an objective item in human cognition and also recalls that, according to Auriol, the “conceived being” is only the proper object of logic. Indeed, it is a being of reason produced by the human intellect. However, we can also notice that, while Pérez uses the term identitas indistinctionis, Auriol refers to unitas indistinctionis. This difference could be used to identify the starting point of Pérez's revision of Auriol's doctrine. The term “unity” prima facie does not mean “identity”. Even though Auriol emphasises the intentional and immediate unity between the apparent being of a thing and the extramental thing, by doing so he is forced to introduce a conceptual distinction between the apparent being and the real being of the extramental thing. He tries to preserve the reality of the extramental thing and its independence from the act of cognition, but at the same times he claims that our acts of cognition are aimed to real things, not to something different produced by our intellect (SPS 3.14.1: 713). According to Pérez, this view should be revised and improved. His first radical claim is that the objective item of cognition is nothing but the act of cognition itself. This conclusion is consistent with Pérez's doctrine combining connotation and virtual reflection. We should recall these two statements made by Pérez: (1) the cognised object is always constituted by the act of cognition, and (2) every act of cognition virtually reflects on itself. This means that the formal side of cognition cannot be distinguished neither according to a real distinction nor according to a distinction of reason from the objective side.

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\((OP\ I\ VI.3.3.45: 489a)\). From this perspective, the former and the latter seem to be more than two conceptually separable items of an intentional unity taking place inside the intellect of the cognising subject. By contrast, Pérez avoids every possible immediate distinction between the formal and the objective side of cognition, in order to affirm a more genuine intentional identity between the cognising subject and the cognised object.

According to Pérez’s interpretation, in Auriol’s theory of cognition the apparent being of a thing –i.e. the being of reason– and the cognised object always appear together and, thus, are intentionally identical, but not perfectly or supremely identical (\(non\ quidem\ identitatatem\ summa\ et\ perfecta,\ sed\ intentionaliter\)). Of course, Auriol often states that the extramental thing and the thing insofar as it appears are the same thing, but they have two different kinds of being (\(duplex\ esse\)), real and intentional respectively (\(SPS-e\ 9.1.1: 8.339-341;\ SPS-e\ 27.2.2: 18.638-649\)). According to Pérez, this duplicity runs the risk of a doubling, or repetition between the apparent being of a thing and the real being of the extramental thing. He argues that Auriol’s claim about intentional unity between the apparent being of the cognised thing and the real being of the extramental thing is very close to a case of identity of indistinction (\(OP\ I\ VI.3.3.47: 489a\)). In addition to “unity of indistinction”, Auriol often uses the adverb “indistinguishably” (\(indistinguibiliter\)) to describe the strong bond, involved by cognition, between the apparent being and the real being of a thing (\(SPS-e\ 27.2.2: 16.585-590\)). This could be one of the reasons why Pérez interprets the “unity of indistinction” as synonymous with “identity of indistinction”. However, there is also a more compelling reason for this. Indeed, as will be seen below, Auriol himself describes the unity between the apparent being and the real being of a thing as a case of identity of indistinction.

Pérez wishes to emphasise in a more radical way the identity between the apparent being and the real being of the extramental being. His criticism is also grounded on the distinction drawn by Auriol between “identity of indistinction” and “identity of repetition” (\(identitas\ repetitionis\)). Pérez finds the description of these two kinds of identity in Auriol’s Commentaria in primum librum Sententiarum 1.6. Here, Auriol focuses on the possibility that the blessed can see the divine essence conceptually (\(conceptibiliter\)), disregarding trinitarian persons. The \(quaestio\) involves the possibility for a human intellect to grasp the essence of God, without seeing the divine persons, who are essential and really identical to God. Furthermore, what is at stake here concerns the possibility of introducing some kind of distinction in God, who is absolutely simple. In order to clarify some doubts, concerning his defence of the simplicity of God, Auriol illustrates the two aforementioned identities. Pérez will consider this distinction independently of the theological context in which it is placed. According to Auriol, the identity of repetition is verified when the same thing is repeated according to the following cases: (1) through the same term –e.g., “Socrates, Socrates”–; (2) through the same concept, but using a different term –e.g., “Marcus Tullius”–; and, finally, (3) through a different term and a different concept –e.g., “Socrates, human being, animal”– (\(SPS\ 1.4.6: 99.364-365\)). According to Auriol, the repetition is always made possible by a being of reason produced by the human intellect. For instance, the concept of “human being”, in the third case, repeats “Socrates” by signifying him as cognised (\(SPS\ 1.4.6: 99.364-365\)) but expressing him with a different term. As seen before, according to Auriol the act of cognition is composed by a real being –i.e. the extramental thing– and a being of reason –i.e. the apparent being of the thing-as-cognised–. For this very reason, according to Pérez Auriol’s account of the act of cognition seems to be consistent with a case of identity of repetition and not of identity of indistinction. However, Auriol himself holds that the unity between the apparent being of a thing and its extramental being is a case of identity of indistinction. Pérez’s intention is to make Auriol’s teaching more consistent, supporting the identity of indistinction between the apparent being and the real being of the thing, but redefining this kind of identity.
According to Auriol, the identity of indistinction requires two real natures which are always undistinguished, even though they are not the same thing. For example, the conformation of a surface (lenitas) is different from the surface itself (superficies), even though the human intellect cannot distinctly grasp them (SPS 1.4.6: 99.364). This kind of identity is an essential property of both real natures and neither of them is a being of reason produced by the human intellect (SPS 1.4.6: 99.365).

Auriol relates the identity of repetition and the identity of indistinction respectively to the first two kinds of per se predication (modi dicendi per se). More in general, he remarks that every per se predication entails a certain kind of identity between the subject and the predicate (SPS 2.3.4.11: 90.597). According to the first kind of per se predication, a predicate A is assigned to a subject B, because A expresses a property belonging to the essence of B. For instance, the predicate “human being” repeats “Socrates”, because it expresses a property intrinsically belonging to Socrates. Furthermore, at least one of the two items composing the identity of repetition and, thus, the first kind of per se predication is united to the other by an intellectual act. However, according to the first kind of per se predication, when the subject of a predication is a primary substance, that which is predicated is intrinsic to the substance. The latter, inasmuch as it is an individual being, is not produced by the human intellect, and thus is outside it. Indeed, as Auriol stated, only secondary substances, i.e. genera and species, exist in the intellect (SPS 2.3.4.11: 90.597).

By contrast, the second kind of per se predication requires both a real identity and an intellectual one on the side of one of the two items composing the identity – e.g. a property belonging to a subject. We can clarify this kind of predication with the following example. The concept expressing the equality between three angles of a triangle and two right angles (henceforth, C1) cannot exist and be cognised without the concept of “triangle” (henceforth, C2). Consequently, on the side of the property expressed by C1, there is a real and intellectual identity of indistinction between C1 and C2. On the contrary, there is both a real and an intellectual distinction between C2 and C1 on the side of the subject “triangle”, because we can grasp C2 without conceiving C1. In brief, we can cognise C2 without C1, but not vice versa (SPS 2.3.4.11: 90.597-598). This does not mean that the property expressed by C1 is not an essential property of the triangle, but only that it can be obtained through a demonstration, or at least it is not immediately evident. If we consider an essential property of a subject, the identity of indistinction is necessary and immediate, while if we look at the subject, the identity of indistinction is necessary, but in a mediated manner. In other words, we cannot immediately think of a triangle while at the same time thinking that the sum of its internal angles must equal the sum of two right angles. On the contrary, thinking about the sum of three internal angles belonging to a triangle requires thinking immediately and necessarily about a triangle.

To support his claim, Auriol also quotes the III Book of De anima and recalls Aristotle’s theory on the apprehension of indivisibles (ἀδιαιρέτων νόησις) or apprehensio simplex (CPS 33.3: 739b). He argues that the identity between the two concepts constituting this apprehension cannot be “of repetition”, also introducing the third main difference between the two kinds of identity. The two items composing the identity of repetition are always signified directly (in recto) by the intellect, albeit denoted by different terms (voces). A comparison between these two items (e.g., A and B) could only be possible by means of an act of negation, by saying that A is not B and vice versa (CPS 33.3: 739b-740a). On the contrary, the reality of a cognised thing and the reality of its cognised being are identical for indistinction because they respectively signify directly (in recto) and indirectly (in obliquo) (CPS 33.3: 740a). Auriol stresses

that the identity of indistinction is characterised by two really and conceptually correlative sides, not separable, of the same entity. Only a reflexive act of the intellect can separate and grasp what is immediately indistinct, namely the extramental thing and the thing-as-cognised (CPS 33.3: 740b).

This description of the identity of indistinction is avoided by Pérez. Indeed, according to him the identity of indistinction is possible between two truly existing realities that are mutually identical, one of which has always an indeterminate being (esse interminatum) and lacks a proper unity. Like the primary matter, which cannot be cognised without the relationship with a substantial form, or also like an accident which can only be cognised by referring to a substance, the indeterminate reality can be grasped by an act of cognition only if united to the other reality (OP I VI.2.2: 49: 449b). Focusing on the identity of indistinction characterising the act of cognition, we can observe that the apparent being plays the role of an indeterminate reality. As seen above, this indeterminate reality was also called ratio formalissima sub qua objectiva. It constitutes every act of cognition, but it is catchable by the human intellect only when related with a determinate entity. According to Pérez’s doctrine, the apparent being can be applied to any intelligible content and can be participated by any intelligent nature –God, angels, and human beings– although, by its very nature, the apparent being is indeterminate and universal. We can consider the apparent being as a transcendental property of being qua being. As seen above, this indeterminate reality was also called ratio formalissima sub qua objectiva. It constitutes every act of cognition, but it is catchable by the human intellect only when related with a determinate entity. According to Pérez’s doctrine, the apparent being can be applied to any intelligible content and can be participated by any intelligent nature –God, angels, and human beings– although, by its very nature, the apparent being is indeterminate and universal. We can consider the apparent being as a transcendental property of being qua being. It represents being inasmuch as it can appear to any intelligent nature. We cannot further explore this aspect of Pérez’s thought, but in his treatise De visione Dei, Pérez uses the term “form of intellection” (forma intellectionis) as a synonym of apparent being, describing this point in depth and significantly extending Auriol’s doctrine to a metaphysical field.45

3. Conclusion

Pérez’s theory of cognition is clearly in debt to Auriol’s teaching on the apparent being. Like Auriol, Pérez identifies the act of cognition with the intelligible species, employs the logical tool of connotation to describes the cognitive act, and supports the intentional identity between the apparent being of a thing-as-cognised and real being of the same thing outside the soul. Pérez often does use of the same linguistic expressions as Auriol. Both Pérez and Auriol ground their theory of intentional identity on Aristotle’s De anima. However, Pérez emphasises an inconsistency which affects Auriol’s teaching on intentional identity. He revises Auriol’s theory, adding the Suarezian doctrine of virtual reflexion, and redefines the identity of indistinction, in order to present the apparent being as an undetermined reality which coincides with the act of cognition as such. This Pérezian revision of Auriol’s theory, on the one hand, can be considered as a relevant case of a wider revisionism, applied by early modern scholastics to medieval thinkers. On the other, this revisionism finds a wider application beyond the field of intentionality, in Pérez’s metaphysics and philosophical anthropology (Soliani, 2018: 81-95; 194-226). In Pérez’s writings, the so called “form of intellection”, i.e. the “apparent being”, is like a platonic form, which informed every possible intellect –human, angelic or divine– and confirms Pérez’s tendency to renew philosophy and theology through a neoplatonic and Augustinian paradigm.46

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45 Pérez, De visione Dei 2.1: c. 239: “forma intellectionis est applicabilis omni objecto et accommoda ad percipienda distinctionem rerum, non solum materialler, sed etiam formaliter ut distinctionem. Haec autem forma est per se cognoscibilis a quolibet habente ipsum abstrahendo ab hoc et illo objecto, seu comprehendendo omnia” (same text in OP I, 149, 50a). On this topic, see Soliani, 2018: 90-95.

46 Jacob Schmutz defined Pérez’s thought as the starting point of a révolution néo-augustinienne inside early modern scholastic tradition. See Schmutz, 2003a: 347.
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