ARTÍCULOS Antonio Pérez (1599-1649) on Intentional Identity: A Revisionism of Peter Auriol’s Thought "

This article studies Antonio Pérez’s revision of Peter Auriol’s intentional identity between the apparent being of a thing-as-cognised and its extramental real being. Pérez’s theory of cognition is clearly in debt with Auriol’s theory of intentionality. As Auriol did, Pérez grounded his account on the logical tool of connotation and on the identity between the intelligible species and the act of cognition. Pérez agrees with Auriol’s theory, affirming an identity of indistinction between the apparent being of the thing-as-cognised and the real being of the extramental thing. However, Pérez does not seem to be fully satisfied with Auriol’s account of cognition and introduces two relevant changes. First, he employs the Suarezian doctrine that every intentional act, while directly aims to an object, virtually or indirectly reflects on itself. As a consequence, he supports an identity between the formal side –i.e. the act of cognition– and the objective side –i.e. the thing-as-cognised–. Second, he provides a definition of the identity of indistinction which is different from that of Auriol. By doing so, Pérez equates the apparent being with a universal form, i.e. the act of cognition as such, characterizing every particular act of cognition as proper to every intelligent being. This indeterminate form, then, can be determined by every possible object.

As noticed by Jacob Schmutz (2003a: 371), in Spain, during the 16th century, Peter Auriol was often detected and ridiculed. In the second half of 16th century, at Salamanca, Miguel de Palacio targeted Auriol's claims on the identity between the species and actio intelligendi (Spruit, 1995: II, 275-276). 5 After a few decades, at Coimbra, Gil Fonseca, alias "Aegidius a Praesentatione" , an important Augustinian theologian, 6 challenged Auriol's theory of cognition, and criticised the same opinion, defining it as alien[a] a vera Philosophia (Disp. de Beat. 8.1.1.6: 209b). Almost in the middle of the 17th century, when Pérez was teaching at Collegio Romano, the Franciscans Bartolomeo Mastri rejected Auriol's account of cognition and defended Duns Scotus's teaching. He holds that, according to Auriol, the "understanding" (intelligere) consists in a passive reception of the intelligible species and the mental word is the cognised object (Disp. in De an. 6.3: 142b and 144a). 7 However, this is only a part of the story. By studying Mastri's criticism of Auriol's theory of the objective being -i.e. the apparent being of a thing-as-cognised-with reference to the distinction of reason, Sven Knebel (2000: 23-24) notes that, despite criticism, inside and outside of the Franciscan order, the influence of Auriol on the 17th century is real, albeit it is hard to trace. According to Knebel, Mastri interprets Auriol as William of Ockham and Walter Chatton did. For Mastri, Auriol's objective being would be a third realm -between the real being and the being of reason produced by the intellect-, which does not allow to terminate the cognitive act in the real being of a thing, but only to its being known. However, Knebel also emphasises the appreciation of Auriol by some Jesuits like Antonio Pérez, Diego Ruiz de Montoya (1562-1632), Francisco de Oviedo (1602-1651, and the Theatine Zaccaria Pasqualigo ( † 1664). 8 He also draws attention on Mastri's consideration of Auriol as the Promptuarium noeticorum, who exerted a peculiar influence on the Jesuit school (schola Jesuitarum) (Mastri,Disp. in Met.6.1.4: 279b). 9 By contrast, Pérez supports Auriol's doctrine about the identity of the intelligible species with the act of cognition, reinforcing it -quite surprisingly-10 with Aquinas' teaching, and with a reference to the Paduan philosopher Jacopo Zabarella. 11 Before Pérez, Jesuits like Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1503Mendoza ( -1575 and Girolamo Fasolo (1567-1639, interpreted Aquinas's account of cognition as a form of direct realism. 12 According to Hurtado, the mental word produced by the intellect, through its act, is the thing itself as cognised. Like Pérez, Hurtado identifies mental word and act of cognition (Schmutz, 2007: 188-193). Hurtado and Pérez's theory of cognition might be also considered as an attempt to find a convergence between the authority of Aquinas and Auriol's gnoseology.

Gian Pietro Soliani
Pérez's concern in Auriol's writings and way of thought has been already emphasised by scholars. 13 Pérez always defined Auriol as the sharpest (acutissimus) thinker among philosophers and theologians he had read. 14 This fascination with Auriol can be explained by looking at the years of Pérez's education in Salamanca (1618Salamanca ( -1624, where he studied theology under the guidance of Jesuit masters like Valentin de Herice and Hurtado de Mendoza, both readers and admirers of Auriol's Commentary on the Sentences (Schmutz, 2003a: 371-372), published between 1596 and 1605, thanks to the Franciscan cardinal Costanzo Torri Boccadifuoco di Sarnano (1531Sarnano ( -1595. This article investigates a particular aspect of Auriol and Pérez's account of cognition, which is the intentional identity between the appearance and the reality of a thing. According to Auriol, the apparent being (esse apparens), namely the proper being of a thing-as-cognised, and the real being of the thing itself outside the intellect, are two different kinds of being, but the thing is one and the same. Indeed, he claims that the apparent being is only a "diminished" being (ens diminutum) and is called "being" only in a metaphorical sense. While accepting many aspects of Auriol's theory of cognition, Pérez revises it, introducing the Suarezian doctrine of virtual reflection 15 and a new definition of "identity of indistinction" (identitas indistinctionis) to support a more radical view of the intentional identity between the apparent being of the thing-as-cognised and the real being of the extramental thing.
In order to describe Pérez's revision of Auriol's intentional identity, I have organized this article in three parts. In the first part, I shall present some crucial aspects of Pérez's account of the act of cognition, by clarifying the meaning of the terms used by him as well as his philosophical method, both with references to Hurtado de Mendoza and Auriol. In the second part, I shall consider the Pérezian criticism against Auriol's theory of intentional identity, by considering some texts belonging to the Scriptum super primum Sententiarum. 16 Finally, I shall propose some brief conclusions.

Hurtado's teaching and Auriol's influence on Pérez
Before introducing Pérez's account of intentionality, in general, and the act of cognition, in particular, it is necessary to look at the logical approach to intentional acts employed by Hurtado de Mendoza. 17 In his Disputationes de Summulis, 18 Hurtado introduces the scholastic distinction between the "formal concept" (conceptus formalis) and the "objective concept" (conceptus obiectivus). This distinction is well known to scholars, and was popularised at the end of the 16th century by Francisco Suárez's Disputationes metaphysicae (1597). 19 According to Hurtado, the formal concept stands for the act of cognition which represents the object, while the objective concept is the object inasmuch as it is represented by the cognitive act. Hurtado also draws a distinction between "formal ways of knowing" (modus sciendi formalis), i.e. a set of 13 See Knebel, 1992: 194 and2000: 23-24;Ramelow, 1997: 67;Schmutz, 2003a: 370-397;Soliani, 2018: 11-17, 33-34 and 218-219. 14 Pérez, OP I II.  Knebel, 1992: 194 andSchmutz, 2003a: 370-371

ARTÍCULOS
Antonio Pérez (1599-1649) on Intentional Identity... cognitive acts by which the intellect defines, distinguishes or argues, and "objective ways of knowing" (modus sciendi objectivus), which are the objects as cognised. Furthermore, every cognised object has corresponding formal ways of knowing (DS I.5: 74b). Hurtado argues that, from a logical perspective, the act of cognition always denominates something, constituting it as an objective way of knowing. This denominative capacity is manifested by linguistic terms like "genus", "specific difference", "premise", "conclusion", and so on. At the same time, every objective way of knowing denominates its corresponding formal way of knowing. In conclusion, for Hurtado, logicians cannot analyse a formal way of knowing without a reference to the objective one, and vice versa. As a consequence of this correlation between a formal and an objective side of cognition, Hurtado holds that the adequate object of logic is both the act of cognition and the thing (res) insofar as it is cognised, as well as the formal ways of knowing and the objective ways of knowing. However, these two aforementioned sides of cognition play two different roles. The act of cognition, indeed, is conceived by Hurtado like a formal reason which constitutes and denominates (ratio formalis constituens et denominans) the cognised thing (obiectivum). By contrast, the cognised thing is like a matter (materia) and a subject (subiectum) which is constituted and determined by the cognitive act. 20 As already noticed by scholars, this logical perspective resorting to denominative terms in order to describe the intentional act can be explained by the influence on Hurtado's thought of nominalism and the so-called Auriol's conceptualism (Schmutz, 2003a: 301-302). 21 Denominative terms represent a recurring topic in early modern scholastic treatises on logic. Indeed, at the beginning of Aristotle's Categoriae we can find a definition of paronym terms (παρώνυμα), which medieval scholastics called denominativa. Two paronym terms, i.e. a noun and its corresponding adjective, denote concrete objects, which (1) derive their denomination from an abstract term; (2) differ from each other in the desinence or case (πτῶσις); and (3) have in common the same linguistic root. 22 The Aristotelian account on paronyms is not fully accepted by Hurtado. He argues that there is a real difference, and not only a grammatical one, between a denominative term like "white" (album) and its denominating form, i.e. "whiteness" (albedo) (DS I.5: 143b). Furthermore, Hurtado applies the theory of denomination to the acts of seeing, love, cognition and other intentional acts, distinguishing between extrinsic and intrinsic denominations. Denominative terms, such as "seen" (visum), "loved" (amatum) or "cognised" (cognitum), when assigned to an extramental thing, are extrinsic denominations, caused by an external denominating form, i.e. respectively, the act of seeing, love, or cognition. By contrast, denominative terms, such as "seeing", "loving" or "cognising", are intrinsic denominations due to the same denominating form which originates in the human subject insofar as he is seeing, loving, or cognising (DS I.6: 144b).
According to Hurtado, an intentional act, arising from a human subject, is able to generate some denominations, subsequently studied by logicians. By contrast, the "science of the soul" (animastica) considers intentional acts in their proper nature, as well as their vitality, certainty, truth, and relationship with an active power (potentia vitalis), like intellect and free will (DS I.5.34: 77b). Narrowing the focus on the act of cognition, in Hurtado's view, logic is concerned with the "being cognised" (esse cognitum), namely "that which is an intellectual object". Hurtado clarifies that an objective way of knowing can be analysed under three different perspectives: (a) according to itself (secundum se), (b) according to its attributes and predicates, or (c) according to an extrinsic reason (extrinseca ratio), by which some logical entities, like "genus", "species", "subject", and "predicate", can be called objects. This third perspective is that proper to logic. For Hurtado, an objective way of knowing formally takes its name from an act of cognition. Indeed, "being an object of the intellect" (esse obiectum intellectus) and "being cognised" (esse cognitum) are formally the same property, because that which is cognised receives its being from a cognitive act and, thus, the property of "being an object" (DS I.5.26: 74b-75a). The act of cognition objectifies the extramental thing, constituing the "being cognised" of the latter. However, as seen above, the formal way of knowing and the objective way of knowing are two inseparable and correlative entities, constituting a sort of intentional synolon of form and matter. In 1624, in a new edition of the Disputationes de Summulis, Hurtado argues that the aforementioned extrinsic denominations, studied by logicians, are real and cannot be distinguished by their corresponding cognitive act. For this very reason, the proper object of logic is the "real being" (ens reale) and not a mere "being of reason" (ens rationis). Indeed, the cognitive act is real, and cannot be separated from the extrinsic denomination, which is assigned to the extramental thing. Similarly, the term "cognising", referred to an intrinsic denomination and attributed to the intelligent subject, is also real. Hurtado explains this point, affirming that the intentional act, conceived as a "denominating form" (forma denominans), is a real being, which immediately constitutes something in a particular kind of being, i.e. the cognised being (Log. I.4.4.72, 56a).
Like Hurtado, his pupil Antonio Pérez describes the intentional act as a denominating form and conceives the act of cognition and the cognised object as two connotative terms. He claims that his own method is not a novelty, but the same followed in De anima III and Ethica Nichomachea, where Aristotle explains his view on the intentional acts (OP II IV.4.7.1.3: 282a). In order to clarify his position, Pérez resorts to paronyms, through an analysis of the relationship between concrete and abstract terms. A concrete term can signify three different items: (1) what possesses a form (habens); (2) what is possessed (habitus), i.e. the form itself; and (3) the possession (habitio) of a form, which is a middle term expressing a union between the first and the second item (OP II IV.7.1.9: 282b). To be more precise, (1) and (2) are concrete terms, while (3) is an abstract term. However, the meaning of (3) can be only elucidated through a reference to the first or the second item. Pérez applies this logical doctrine to the intentional act starting from the act of seeing, because, according to a common Aristotelian view, things which can be sensed (sensibilia) and the act of seeing are the best known for a human being. 23 He claims that in order to elaborate an instant definition of "the act of seeing whiteness" (visio albedinis), we can start from two different entities, which are (1) "the human subject seeing whiteness" (videns albedinem) and (2) "the whiteness seen" (albedo visa). In the first case, we can define "the act of seeing" (visio) as an abstract notion (notio) referring to the seeing subject. By contrast, in the second case, a definition of the act of seeing is referred to the whiteness seen. Pérez argues that both definitions signify the same thing, i.e. the act of seeing whiteness. However, there is a distinction of reason between the act of seeing and the seeing subject, given that the former is the abstract concept denominating the latter. The same kind of distinction takes place between the act of seeing and the whiteness seen. These two distinctions of reason are due to the connotative nature of the two concrete entities, i.e. the seeing subject and the whiteness seen. 24 As pointed out by Alain De Libera (1999: 357), this overlap between the field covered by the paronymy and that of connotation is a geste théorétique performed by Ockham (Ord. I.2.9: 14-17) and his successors. More in detail, according to Ockham, connotative terms are a class of denominative terms (Pellettier, 2012: 168). Peter Auriol also made a wide use of connotation to explain his view about the cognitive act. 25 He argues that a connotative term has always a double meaning. It directly (in recto) signifies something and indirectly co-signifies (in obliquo) another thing. By applying this doctrine to the being cognised, i.e. the apparent being, Auriol argues, followed by Pérez, that "understanding" (intelligere) formally means a determinate connotation (determinatum connotatum), namely "having present something as something which appears". 26 Like Pérez, he explicitly employs the aforementioned term habitio to define the formal reason of intellection as a possession of something according to the mode of that which appears under the way of the spiritual appearance (SPS-e 35.1.1: 8.402-403). In other words, the abstract term "understanding" always means a direct reference to a concrete object insofar as it is cognised, but also a direct reference to a cognising subject (SPS-e 35.1.1: 7.353-354). However, subject and object cannot be grasped without an indirect reference to "understanding", namely to an act of cognition.
Pérez also emphasises the strong bond between the abstract concept and the concrete one, claiming that every abstract needs the existence of its corresponding concrete (OP II VI.2.4.17: 487a). He argues that the act of seeing, for instance, has a structure consisting of a seeing subject and an object seen, both directly denominated by the act itself and predicated in recto, while the act is a constitutive and denominating form, predicated in obliquo (OP II IV.7.1.7: 282a). 27 According to Pérez, the easiest way -and the closest to daily experience-to conceive the meaning of a concrete term, such as "white", is to define it as "an entity which possesses whiteness, which denominates and makes something white". Here, whiteness is signified by the concrete term "white" in obliquo and confuse. If the meaning of the term "whiteness" were unknown, then the following definition of the term "white" would be "an entity which possesses that by which it is named and constituted white". Similarly, a human being who ignored the term "whiteness" could give this definition: "whiteness is that whose possession makes something white". 28 The relationship between "whiteness" and "white" is like the relationship, described above, between an abstract concept and a concrete one.
27 What is predicated in recto is directly predicated or predicated in the nominative case because it is the subject of a proposition. On the contrary, what is predicated in obliquo is indirectly predicated or predicated in a case other than nominative. The former is obtained through an act of abstraction by the latter, and logicians call it with a different term, such as "form", "act", and "quality" of the concrete concept. If things are signified in a natural and proper way, then the concrete concept refers to a physical subject possessing (habens) a form, which is possessed by the subject and named with an abstract term. Similarly, if things are signified in an artificial and improper way, then that which possesses the form is considered like a concrete subject -albeit it is not a physical subject-, and the form is that which is possessed (OP II IV.7.1.6: 282a).
Returning to the example of the act of seeing, the object seen is named by Pérez "objective concrete" (concretum obiectivum), and is the most known quoad nos, because it is closer to senses. By contrast, the concrete entity composed by the seeing subject and the act of seeing cannot be grasped by the senses. The "seeing subject" can be directly (in recto) conceived only by the intellect, which grasps the substance of the seeing person, while the objective concrete -i.e. the object-as-seen-can only be sensed (OP II IV.7.1.10: 282b-283a). In fact, according to Pérez, only the object can be directly sensed, while the act of seeing is indirectly sensed through an act of virtual reflection (reflexio virtualis) (OP II IV.7.2.1: 285a). 29 Virtual reflection may be understood as a sort of prereflexive capacity, which Pérez considers essential to every intentional act. He clarifies that every intentional act, albeit directly addressing an object, can indirectly or virtually aim to itself. The intentional object, indeed, is constituted by the intentional act itself. For this very reason, the intentional act can aim to its object as long as it virtually addresses itself. As will be seen below, virtual reflection supports an idea of intentional identity, which is consequently at the heart of Pérez's criticism of Auriol's doctrine of intentionality. Pérez's view on the correlation between the act and the thing-as-cognised can be expressed in the following way: on the one hand, the object cannot be cognised without a reference, albeit indirect, to the intentional act and, on the other, a reflection on the intentional act always involves a reference to the intentional object (OP II IV.7.7.1.11: 283a).
Pérez considers virtual reflection as an implicit teaching included in De anima II.4.415a 14-23. Here, Aristotle argues that the intentional acts belonging to a power of the soul can be known only through its proper objects. In fact, he interprets this Aristotelian teaching through the abstract-concrete relationship briefly presented above. By considering the case of the act of cognition, Pérez states that the objective concrete is the best known (notissimum) for us. When the intellect grasps this concrete, it also cognises the intentional act -i.e. the abstract one-, which constitutes the object as a cognised object (OP II IV.7.1.12: 283a).
According to Pérez, virtual reflection also allows to distinguish the different ways of knowing (modum cognoscendi), which characterise a particular science (OP II IV.3.1.18: 222b). Indeed, Pérez's theory of virtual reflection also intersects the Aristotelian doctrine, which assigns one most formal object (obiectum formalissimum) to each intentional power, in order to specify and distinguish a power from another (OP II IV.3.6.1.13: 283a). The most formal object of an intentional power is the most general aspect which is common to every singular object and can be aimed by a given intentional power. According to 29 The doctrine of virtual reflection is a direct influence of Suárez on Pérez's thought. It is often distinguished from formal reflection, which consists in a direct reflection of the act on itself (OP II IV.7.2.1: 285a). Pérez also refers to his Scholastic sources, such as Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas -albeit the expression "reflexio virtualis" does not seem to be traceable in the medieval Scholasticism. On Augustinian, medieval and Suarezian roots of Pérez's virtual reflection, see Soliani, 2018: 46-59. On the concept of virtual reflection in the 17th century Scholasticism, see Knebel, 2016: 57-88. According to him, Pérez was a key figure, who coordinated two different conceptions of virtual reflection. The first one is present in the Jesuit theologian Francesco Amico (1578-1651) who describes virtual reflection as a series of infinite reflexive cognitions (De Deo 12.9: 192b). The second conception goes back to the Augustinian theologian Gil Fonseca, who argues in favour of a prereflexive dimension of the act of apprehension (Disp. de Beat. VI.9.6.9: 579b). The originality of Pérez's virtual reflection consists in a more extended application of this concept to all intentional acts.

ARTÍCULOS
Antonio Pérez (1599-1649) on Intentional Identity... Pérez, even the most formal object of an intentional power is constituted by the act of the power itself, taken in a general way and called ratio formalissima sub qua. For instance, the most formal object of the act of seeing is different from any other formal object pertaining to any other intentional power. Now, the intentional object is constituted by the act of seeing itself and, at the same time, specifies its corresponding intentional power and allows to distinguish a power from another. The most formal object of the act of seeing is a concrete constituted by an abstract entity, which is the act itself and is called ratio formalissima sub qua obiectiva. As a consequence, a ratio obiectiva constituting an intentional object -formalissima sub qua or not-is not an object, but the intentional act itself (OP II IV.3.6.1.13: 283a). This doctrine clearly seems to be an attempt to harmonise Aristotle with Auriol. Indeed, unlike Pérez, Auriol does not accept Aristotle's claim that powers of the soul can be distinguished thanks to the objects grasped by their acts. According to Auriol, powers differ in virtue of the way in which they grasp their objects, namely thanks to the mode in which the objects appear (modus apparendi). Indeed. he argues that what can be grasped by the senses can be also caught by imagination and intellect. The same remark goes for the objects of imagination, which can be also grasped by the intellect (SPS-e, 35.1.1: 8.382-385). 30 By contrast, in Pérez's view, the way of appearing, i.e. the intentional act, is an essential component of the cognised object and, thus, Aristotle and Auriol's claims are not really opposed.
According to Pérez, in addition to the intentional act taken in a broader sense, also the powers of the soul, dispositions (habitus), and the intelligible species may be called rationes formalissimae sub quibus, because they can denominate an object and, therefore, participate in the formal nature proper of the intentional act. In more detail, the cognitive power, the scientific disposition, and the intelligible species are, like the act of cognition, rationes which can equally assign denominations belonging to the genus "cognizable" (cognoscibilis). When an object is extrinsically denominated by these rationes, it can also be called "the most formal" (formalissimum), but not in an absolute sense (non absolute). Indeed, according to Pérez, only the objective concrete composed by the most formal object and the intentional act should be considered as the most formal object in a proper sense (OP II IV.7.1.14: 283a-b).

The two sides of cognition
The act of cognition has the same connotative structure as that of any other intentional act. According to Pérez, its ratio formalissima sub qua obiectiva -i.e. as seen above, the cognitive act itself-, can be called, with Auriol's vocabulary, "apparent being" (esse apparens), or also "the being of the cognised" (esse cogniti). In his Commentary on the Sentences, Auriol writes that the formal reason of "understanding" (intelligere), or "cognising" (cognoscere), taken in a universal sense, is nothing but "having something present to the intellect in an apparent way (per modum apparentis)". 31 According to Auriol and Pérez, the apparent being of that which is cognised is a logical and completely immaterial being, which Silvestro Mauro -a Pérez's pupil at Collegio Romano-will conceive as a result of the more elevated grade of abstraction (Doyle, 2013: 181). Like Auriol, Pérez also claims that the cognising subject gives the cognised object: "the intentional being" (esse intentionale) (OP I I.2.22: 5a). 32 However, it should be noted that "the being of the cognised", i.e. "apparent being", is not always synonymous with the more common scholastic syntagma "the being cognised" (esse cognitum). Pérez seems to employ two different meanings of esse cognitum, which can probably be traced back to Suárez. First, "being cognised" may mean "what is intentionally present" (OP II I.1.7.87: 223a) as a result of an extrinsic denomination received by the act of cognition. Second, "being cognised" can be taken as the being a thing has, inasmuch as it is cognised. 33 "The being cognised" and "the being of the cognised" seems to be synonymous only according to the second meaning. In this respect, according to Pérez, they are also synonymous with "apparent being". Since according to Auriol and Pérez, this being is only a logical being due to an extrinsic denomination and connotation, that which belongs to the apparent being does not represent another field of being, but the same being of the extramental things, in so far as they are cognised, i.e. they appear.
In Pérez's view, "the being of the cognised" seems to be as a genus including every cognised object and specified by several ways of knowing, with their specific formal objects. More in detail, Pérez draws the following distinctions -clearly rooted in Aristotelian and medieval tradition-between different acts of cognition, which are: (1) "simple apprehension" (apprehension simplex), subdivided into (1a) "intuitive cognition" (cognitio intuitiva) and (1b) "quidditative cognition" (cognitio quidditativa); and (2) "judgement" (cognitio assensiva seu iudicativa). The formal object of intuitive cognition is always something physically seen, while the formal object of the quidditative cognition is something clearly cognised in its very essence, regardless of the actual existence of the object (OP II IV.7.6.45: 236a). Intuitive cognition is made possible by the physical presence, which depends by the durability (duratio) in time of the extramental thing. In brief, an act of intuitive cognition makes the physical presence of the thing similar to its intentional presence in the intellect (OP II IV.3.11.7: 256a; OP I IV.4.4.47: 340a). On this point, Pérez disagrees with Scotus and Ockham. He argues that only the act of sensation can "intuitively see its objects […], while the created intellect cannot intuitively see its individual and intelligible objects". 34 By contrast, quidditative cognition is the most perfect apprehension: the physical presence (or actual existence) of the object is not required, unless this object is God, whose essence coincides with his existence (OP II IV.3.9.45: 253a). Finally, judgement is the most perfect form of cognition and its formal object is something known in several ways: (1) through an act of assent; (2) as a cause of the assent; (3) thanks to an immediate influx of the object of assent; or finally (4) through a discourse, at least virtual (OP II IV.3.6.46: 238). Pérez claims that the act of judgement is a "locution" (locutio) and the only act of cognition in a proper sense. Apprehension, indeed, should be understood as a matter for a judgement. This is a sort of cognitive hierarchy that includes every kind of human cognitive act; but, from a psychological point of view, what does "cognising" or "understanding" means? Medieval and early modern scholastics were used to discuss many aspects of human cognition within treatises devoted to theological dogmas, such as the trinitarian nature of God (OP I IV.3.36: 312b) or the beatific vision in heaven. In this respect, Pérez makes no exception. However, at the beginning of his career, he also wrote a course on De anima, unfortunately lost so far. Nevertheless, Pérez's theological treatises include many remarks and digressions on some gnoseological issues, and, through them, we can get an idea of his complex theory of cognition. In his course De scientia Dei, Pérez states that the cognising subject (intelligens), through cognition, "makes", "says", "forms", and "really produces" a "mental word" (verbum). 35 This definition firstly concerns the generation of the Divine Word by God the Father and, by analogy, with the human cognition -albeit, in this second case, Pérez admits a "true and real relation" between the created cognisor and the object cognised. 36 By contrast, a real relation between the divine intellect and his object is impossible. Indeed, the object cognised could be only a creature or God itself. Pérez argues that the common theological opinion excludes the possibility of a real relation between God and his creatures, otherwise the former would be dependent on the existence of the latter. Furthermore, we should also avoid the second possibility, because God cannot have a real relation with Himself. 37 Pérez also specifies his definition of "understanding": Intelligere esse habere virtualiter formam qua obiectum reddatur intellectum. Obiectum autem reddi intellectum est produci in esse repraesentato per productionem formae repraesentantis aut saltem per productionem reale praedicati identificati cum ipsa forma repraesentante. (OP I VI.3.3.45: 488b) "Understanding" means virtually possessing a form for which an object is made understood. Making understood an object means to really produce it in a representative being through a production of a representing form or, at least through a real production of a predicate identified with the same representing form. (OP I VI.3.3.45: 488b) Following once again Auriol's vocabulary, Pérez clarifies that constituting the object in the "being of the understood" (esse intellecti) means making it actively present, or giving it an "apparent", "visible" or "seen" being, i.e. an "intelligible being" (esse intelligibile). Like Auriol's theory of cognition, the Pérezian doctrine entails that the act of cognition consists of two different aspects: (1) an active and subjective side, i.e. the act itself coinciding with the intelligent nature of the subject, and (2) a passive and objective one (cognitio obiectiva and quasi passiva), that is a mental word. Pérez calls it "cognition in the being produced" (cognitio in esse producto), by which the extramental thing receives several denominations, such as "cognised", or "known" (ibid.). 38 Unlike the divine act of cognition, which is absolute and coincides with God himself, the human intellect really produces a distinct act of cognition (OP I VI.3.3.46: 488b). The act of cognition is considered like an accidental and representing form or quality, actively relating the cognisor and the object cognised. This representational power Here, the emphasis is on the divine intellect, but the conceptual framework is the same for a human intellect as well. See also, Pérez, OP I I.7.95: 125b. On the "passive conception", e.g. Petrus Aureolus, SPS 23: "obiectiva conceptio passive dicta non respicit rem per modum substrati, immo res quae concipitur est aliquid sui et immiscetur indistinguibiliter sibi. Unde conceptio rosae idem est quod rosa, et conceptus animalis idem quod animal. Iste nimirum conceptus claudit indistinguibiliter realitates omnium particularium animalium et quendam modum essendi, qui est intentionalis, qui non est aliud quam passiva conceptio". (ed. Perler, 1994b: 248). of cognition manifests the immanent and intrinsic vitality of the intelligent nature. 39 However, on this point, Pérez's thought could seem inconsistent. He supports the identity between the intelligent nature and its act, but at other times he distinguishes the former and the latter. We should distinguish two different levels inside Pérez's doctrine. First, during cognitive process, the cognisor and its cognitive act cannot be separated and are one and the same entity. Nevertheless, the act of cognition has its source in the human cognisor and, thus, is ontologically different from the intelligent nature -as an accident is different from a substance. Pérez calls "formal cognition" (formalis cognitio or formalis intellectio) the act of cognition -i.e. the representing or denominative form-identifying it with the predicate "being produced in the represented being", assigned to the object-as-cognised. By contrast, the cognised object is called cognitio obiectiva (ibid.). This distinction clearly recalls in its proper meaning Auriol's distinction between conceptus obiectalis (or obiectivus) and conceptus formalis. The former is nothing but the thing, inasmuch as it objectively appears thanks to a cognitive act, which is its corresponding formal concept (SPS-e 27.2.2: 20.740-742; See also Petrus Aureolus, In Sent. II.9.2: 109a). 40 We should clearly avoid a representationalist interpretation of both Pérez and Auriol's syntagma esse repraesentati. Indeed, Pérez employs the term "represented" as synonymous with "apparent", "seen", "intelligible", "cognised" and so on, just as according to Auriol's theory. The intentional representation of an extramental thing is, in fact, nothing but the thing itself insofar as it is intentionally present and appears to cognisor's intellect. 41

Pérez and Auriol on Intentional Identity
By addressing the issue of the generation of the Divine Word in his treatise De Sacrosancta Trinitate, Pérez makes the claim that, for Auriol, there would be a distinction "on the side of the thing" (a parte rei), placed in the human intellect, between the formal cognition and the objective one (OP I VI.3.3.47: 489a). Pérez generically refers to some excerpts (passim) belonging to the Book 1 of the Commentary on the Sentences. However, he supports his interpretation by noting that Auriol calls "being of reason" (ens rationis) the passive cognition -i.e. the cognised being, or the objective cognition-, and considers it on the side of the object. As a matter of fact, Auriol considers the apparent being of a thing as a "diminished and a metaphorical" (diminute et metaphorice) being, while assigning real being (esse simpliciter) to the extramental thing. 42 Pérez also notes that Auriol's apparent being always appears together with the cognised object, albeit thanks to an imperfect kind of "intentional identity", also called "identity of 39 Pérez, De scientia Dei I.7.106: f. 33r: "Sicut etiam in intelligente creato forma est ipsa qualitas repraesentativa et tamen includit actionem tanquam habitudinem ratione cuius intelligens illam habet formam non mere passive, sed immanenter et vitaliter, atque ab intrinseco". See also Pérez, OP I I.7.106: 127b. Scotus was probably the first medieval thinker who considered the human act of cognition as an accidental quality inherent to the human intellect (Duns Scotus, Ord. I.3.3.2: 537.320-321).
40 See on this topic, Forlivesi, 2002: 11-12. Auriol's Commentary on the Sentences is partially edited in a provisional form by Chris Schabel and Russell Friedam.
41 The representationalist interpretation of Auriol's theory of cognition and perception has recently been criticised by Lička, 2016: 58. The same view about Auriol's act of cognition can be found in Vanni Rovighi, 2007Rovighi, (1st edition 19631960a: 673-680;1960b: 47-65 and 2006(1st edition 1978Grassi, 2005 andAdriaenssen, 2014: 67-97. By contrast, Faustino Prezioso, as it is well known, interprets Auriol's theory of esse apparens as a precursor of modern phenomenalism and Kantian phaenomenon. See, e.g. Prezioso, 1950: 15-43. See, also, Prezioso, 1972: 265-329 and 1976. According to Prezioso, the most problematic aspect concerning Auriol's thought is the possibility of an intuitive cognition of a nonexistent, which paves the way to modern phenomenalism of Descartes, Berkley and Hume (Prezioso 1976: 321). Sofía Vanni Rovighi criticised this interpretation. On the one hand, she considered Auriol as a forerunner of husserlian phenomenology. On the other hand, she deems Auriol's theory of perception as affected by some problems primarily caused by a lack of an updated scientific knowledge. It should be noticed that this interest in the medieval origins of the early modern phenomenalism flourished in Italy thanks to some important philosophers, who operates at the Università Cattolica di Milano, like, among others, Amato Masnovo (1880-1955), Francesco Olgiati (1886-1962), Giuseppe Zamboni (1875-1950), Carlo Giacon (1900-1984), Gustavo Bontadini (1903-1990), and Sofía Vanni Rovighi (1908-1990 as well. The starting point of this debate on the meaning of phenomenalism can be found in Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 32.4 (1940).
indistinction" (OP I VI.3.3.47: 489a). 43 The intentional identity is a consequence of the identity between the being of reason and the passive cognition as such, namely that which Auriol also calls the "being produced in the apparent being". This being of reason or passive cognition always needs to be determined by a specific object, without which it cannot appear, and vice versa (ibid.). This interpretation deserves a comparison with Auriol's texts. In his Commentary on the Sentences, Auriol wrote: Conceptus rosae, licet non sit purum concipi, immo cum hoc est rosa, resolvi tamen non potest in realitatem rosae et ipsum concipi tamquam in duo, immo conceptus rosae obiicitur tamquam quid simplicissimum, et impossibile separari in duo. Et eodem modo Verbum in divinis, quod includit concipi seu generari passive et cum hoc divinam essentiam, resolvi non potest per aliquem intellectum in generari et essentiam, immo est quid simplicissimum propter unitatem indistinctionis omnimodae, quae tanta est realiter in conceptu divino, quanta est intentionaliter in conceptu rosae ab intellectu nostro formato. (SPS-e 9.1: 11.481-488) The concept of the rose, although it is not merely conceived -or, rather, it is the rose with this ["conceived being"], indeed, cannot be divided into the reality of the rose and the conceived being, as if they were two [different items]. On the contrary, the concept of the rose offers itself as something extremely simple and impossible to be separated in two [items]. Similarly, the Divine Word -who includes the conceived being or the passively generated being and, with this one, the divine essence-, cannot be subdivided by means of the intellect in the divine essence and the generated being. On the contrary, [the Word] is something extremely simple, because of the unity of indistinction in all respects, both really in the divine concept and intentionally in the rose as a concept formed by our intellect.  According to Auriol, the thing-as-conceived and the extramental thing are not two separable things. The concept of the thing is "simple". In other words, the thing inasmuch as it is conceived and the extramental thing are the same thing, thanks to a particular kind of intentional unity, called by Auriol "unity of indistinction in all respects". Pérez explicitly accepts this theory, and as seen above, many other aspects of Auriol's account of intentionality. He also admits the presence of an objective item in human cognition and also recalls that, according to Auriol, the "conceived being" is only the proper object of logic. Indeed, it is a being of reason produced by the human intellect. However, we can also notice that, while Pérez uses the term identitas indistinctionis, Auriol refers to unitas indistinctionis. This difference could be used to identify the starting point of Pérez's revision of Auriol's doctrine. The term "unity" prima facie does not mean "identity". Even though Auriol emphasises the intentional and immediate unity between the apparent being of a thing and the extramental thing, by doing so he is forced to introduce a conceptual distinction between the apparent being and the real being of the extramental thing. He tries to preserve the reality of the extramental thing and its independence from the act of cognition, but at the same times he claims that our acts of cognition are aimed to real things, not to something different produced by our intellect (SPS 3.14.1: 713). According to Pérez, this view should be revised and improved. His first radical claim is that the objective item of cognition is nothing but the act of cognition itself. This conclusion is consistent with Pérez's doctrine combining connotation and virtual reflection. We should recall these two statements made by Pérez: (1) the cognised object is always constituted by the act of cognition, and (2) every act of cognition virtually reflects on itself. This means that the formal side of cognition cannot be distinguished neither according to a real distinction nor according to a distinction of reason from the objective side 43 Pérez probably refers to Petrus Aureolus, SPS-e 9.1: 11.513-517. Auriol refers to Averroes, Met. Com. et Ep. IX.7: f. 231vb: "Entia quae non sunt extra animam, non dicuntur esse simpliciter, sed dicuntur esse in anima cogitativa"; Aristoteles, Met. VII.4.1030a25. (OP I VI.3.3.45: 489a). From this perspective, the former and the latter seem to be more than two conceptually separable items of an intentional unity taking place inside the intellect of the cognising subject. By contrast, Pérez avoids every possible immediate distinction between the formal and the objective side of cognition, in order to affirm a more genuine intentional identity between the cognising subject and the cognised object.
According to Pérez's interpretation, in Auriol's theory of cognition the apparent being of a thing -i.e. the being of reason-and the cognised object always appear together and, thus, are intentionally identical, but not perfectly or supremely identical (non quidem identitatem summa et perfecta, sed intentionaliter). Of course, Auriol often states that the extramental thing and the thing insofar as it appears are the same thing, but they have two different kinds of being (duplex esse), real and intentional respectively (SPS-e 9.1. . According to Pérez, this duplicity runs the risk of a doubling, or repetition between the apparent being of a thing and the real being of the extramental thing. He argues that Auriol's claim about intentional unity between the apparent being of the cognised thing and the real being of the extramental thing is very close to a case of identity of indistinction (OP I VI.3.3.47: 489a). In addition to "unity of indistinction", Auriol often uses the adverb "indistinguishably" (indistinguibiliter) to describe the strong bond, involved by cognition, between the apparent being and the real being of a thing . This could be one of the reasons why Pérez interprets the "unity of indistinction" as synonymous with "identity of indistinction". However, there is also a more compelling reason for this. Indeed, as will be seen below, Auriol himself describes the unity between the apparent being and the real being of a thing as a case of identity of indistinction.
Pérez wishes to emphasise in a more radical way the identity between the apparent being and the real being of the extramental being. His criticism is also grounded on the distinction drawn by Auriol between "identity of indistinction" and "identity of repetition" (identitas repetitionis). Pérez finds the description of these two kinds of identity in Auriol's Commentaria in primum librum Sententiarum 1.6. Here, Auriol focuses on the possibility that the blessed can see the divine essence conceptually (conceptibiliter), disregarding trinitarian persons. The quaestio involves the possibility for a human intellect to grasp the essence of God, without seeing the divine persons, who are essential and really identical to God. Furthermore, what is at stake here concerns the possibility of introducing some kind of distinction in God, who is absolutely simple. In order to clarify some doubts, concerning his defence of the simplicity of God, Auriol illustrates the two aforementioned identities. Pérez will consider this distinction independently of the theological context in which it is placed. According to Auriol, the identity of repetition is verified when the same thing is repeated according to the following cases: (1) through the same term -e.g., "Socrates, Socrates"-; (2) through the same concept, but using a different term -e.g., "Marcus Tullius"-; and, finally, (3) through a different term and a different concept -e.g., "Socrates, human being, animal"-(SPS 1.4.6: 99.365). According to Auriol, the repetition is always made possible by a being of reason produced by the human intellect. For instance, the concept of "human being", in the third case, repeats "Socrates" by signifying him as cognised (SPS 1.4.6: 99.364-365) but expressing him with a different term. As seen before, according to Auriol the act of cognition is composed by a real being -i.e. the extramental thing-and a being of reason -i.e. the apparent being of the thing-as-cognised-. For this very reason, according to Pérez Auriol's account of the act of cognition seems to be consistent with a case of identity of repetition and not of identity of indistinction. However, Auriol himself holds that the unity between the apparent being of a thing and its extramental being is a case of identity of indistinction. Pérez's intention is to make Auriol's teaching more consistent, supporting the identity of indistinction between the apparent being and the real being of the thing, but redefining this kind of identity.
According to Auriol, the identity of indistinction requires two real natures which are always undistinguished, even though they are not the same thing. For example, the conformation of a surface (lenitas) is different from the surface itself (superficies), even though the human intellect cannot distinctly grasp them (SPS 1.4.6: 99.364). This kind of identity is an essential property of both real natures and neither of them is a being of reason produced by the human intellect (SPS 1.4.6: 99.365).
Auriol relates the identity of repetition and the identity of indistinction respectively to the first two kinds of per se predication (modi dicendi per se). More in general, he remarks that every per se predication entails a certain kind of identity between the subject and the predicate (SPS 2.3.4.11: 90.597). According to the first kind of per se predication, a predicate A is assigned to a subject B, because A expresses a property belonging to the essence of B. For instance, the predicate "human being" repeats "Socrates", because it expresses a property intrinsically belonging to Socrates. Furthermore, at least one of the two items composing the identity of repetition and, thus, the first kind of per se predication is united to the other by an intellectual act. However, according to the first kind of per se predication, when the subject of a predication is a primary substance, that which is predicated is intrinsic to the substance. The latter, inasmuch as it is an individual being, is not produced by the human intellect, and thus is outside it. Indeed, as Auriol stated, only secondary substances, i.e. genera and species, exist in the intellect (SPS 2.3.4.11: 90.597).
By contrast, the second kind of per se predication requires both a real identity and an intellectual one on the side of one of the two items composing the identity -e.g. a property belonging to a subject. We can clarify this kind of predication with the following example. The concept expressing the equality between three angles of a triangle and two right angles (henceforth, C1) cannot exist and be cognised without the concept of "triangle" (henceforth, C2). Consequently, on the side of the property expressed by C1, there is a real and intellectual identity of indistinction between C1 and C2. On the contrary, there is both a real and an intellectual distinction between C2 and C1 on the side of the subject "triangle", because we can grasp C2 without conceiving C1. In brief, we can cognise C2 without C1, but not vice versa . This does not mean that the property expressed by C1 is not an essential property of the triangle, but only that it can be obtained through a demonstration, or at least it is not immediately evident. If we consider an essential property of a subject, the identity of indistinction is necessary and immediate, while if we look at the subject, the identity of indistinction is necessary, but in a mediated manner. In other words, we cannot immediately think of a triangle while at the same time thinking that the sum of its internal angles must equal the sum of two right angles. On the contrary, thinking about the sum of three internal angles belonging to a triangle requires thinking immediately and necessarily about a triangle.
To support his claim, Auriol also quotes the III Book of De anima and recalls Aristotle's theory on the apprehension of indivisibles (ἀδιαιρέτων νόησις) or apprehensio simplex (CPS 33.3: 739b). 44 He argues that the identity between the two concepts constituting this apprehension cannot be "of repetition", also introducing the third main difference between the two kinds of identity. The two items composing the identity of repetition are always signified directly (in recto) by the intellect, albeit denoted by different terms (voces). A comparison between these two items (e.g., A and B) could only be possible by means of an act of negation, by saying that A is not B and vice versa (CPS 33.3: 739b-740a). On the contrary, the reality of a cognised thing and the reality of its cognised being are identical for indistinction because they respectively signify directly (in recto) and indirectly (in obliquo) (CPS 33.3: 740a). Auriol stresses 44 See Aristoteles, De anima III.6.430a 26-28. that the identity of indistinction is characterised by two really and conceptually correlative sides, not separable, of the same entity. Only a reflexive act of the intellect can separate and grasp what is immediately indistinct, namely the extramental thing and the thing-as-cognised (CPS 33.3: 740b).
This description of the identity of indistinction is avoided by Pérez. Indeed, according to him the identity of indistinction is possible between two truly existing realities that are mutually identical, one of which has always an indeterminate being (esse interminatum) and lacks a proper unity. Like the primary matter, which cannot be cognised without the relationship with a substantial form, or also like an accident which can only be cognised by referring to a substance, the indeterminate reality can be grasped by an act of cognition only if united to the other reality (OP I VI.2.2: 49: 449b). Focusing on the identity of indistinction characterising the act of cognition, we can observe that the apparent being plays the role of an indeterminate reality. As seen above, this indeterminate reality was also called ratio formalissima sub qua obiectiva. It constitutes every act of cognition, but it is catchable by the human intellect only when related with a determinate entity. According to Pérez's doctrine, the apparent being can be applied to any intelligible content and can be participated by any intelligent nature -God, angels, and human beings-although, by its very nature, the apparent being is indeterminate and universal. We can consider the apparent being as a transcendental property of being qua being. It represents being inasmuch as it can appear to any intelligent nature. We cannot further explore this aspect of Pérez's thought, but in his treatise De visione Dei, Pérez uses the term "form of intellection" (forma intellectionis) as a synonym of apparent being, describing this point in depth and significantly extending Auriol's doctrine to a metaphysical field. 45

Conclusion
Pérez's theory of cognition is clearly in debt to Auriol's teaching on the apparent being. Like Auriol, Pérez identifies the act of cognition with the intelligible species, employs the logical tool of connotation to describes the cognitive act, and supports the intentional identity between the apparent being of a thing-as-cognised and real being of the same thing outside the soul. Pérez often does use of the same linguistic expressions as Auriol. Both Pérez and Auriol ground their theory of intentional identity on Aristotle's De anima. However, Pérez emphasises an inconsistency which affects Auriol's teaching on intentional identity. He revises Auriol's theory, adding the Suarezian doctrine of virtual reflexion, and redefines the identity of indistinction, in order to present the apparent being as an undetermined reality which coincides with the act of cognition as such. This Pérezian revision of Auriol's theory, on the one hand, can be considered as a relevant case of a wider revisionism, applied by early modern scholastics to medieval thinkers. On the other, this revisionism finds a wider application beyond the field of intentionality, in Pérez's metaphysics and philosophical anthropology (Soliani, 2018: 81-95;194-226). In Pérez's writings, the so called "form of intellection", i.e. the "apparent being", is like a platonic form, which informed every possible intellect -human, angelic or divine-and confirms Pérez's tendency to renew philosophy and theology through a neoplatonic and Augustinian paradigm. 46