Semantic ambiguity as a philosophical resource in Plato’s Hippias mino

Abstract

The Hippias minor is one of Plato’s shortest dialogues. Its location within the corpus as a whole is a source of controversy among specialists. Although the authenticity of the dialogue was proven by a mention of Aristotle in Metaphysics V, 1025 a 6, there have been those who have absolutely dismissed its philosophical value. Far from this extreme position, there are those who have pointed out the propaedeutic sense that dialogue would have with respect to some recurrent themes in Plato’s later work. Likewise, in recent years, readings have been proposed that attempt to show the tensions that the Hippias would present in relation to texts by other socratics. In the present work we will try a vindication of the dialogue according to its intrinsic value, considering that Plato offers in it a subtle distinction of two different conceptual frameworks, on the same terminological basis. If the argumentation goes in the right direction, we will see that Plato’s philosophical gesture in this dialogue consists of operating with a series of critical terms for the Athenian conscience at the end of the 5th century BC, to inscribe in them two possible meanings, thus restoring their problematic nature.