Actualidad, indexicalidad y estatus ontológico

Abstract

The present work aims to support a metaphysical position known as modal realism. This position defends the thesis according to which the actual world and possible worlds have the same ontological status, i.e. the thesis of the plurality of worlds. For this purpose, I must show that the thesis that supports the indexicality of actuality can be sustained. In this regard we will divide the work into four sections: in the first one we will reconstruct the main arguments in favor of this thesis. In the second part we will analyze some objections made by Barrio, focusing on the assertion that modal realism cannot account for the difference between “existing” and “existing actuality” without falling into a circular argument or assuming what have to proved. In the third one, I will propose three counter-arguments to the objections of the previous section: the modal argument, the ontological argument, and the epistemic argument. And finally we will state the conclusions.