The union between the separate intellect and the individuals, according to Siger of Brabant

Abstract

When presenting the doctrines of Sigerio de Bravante it is important to determine what is the most accurate starting point in regard to the tendencies of his philosophy. Fortunately, following Aristotle and Averroes, Sigerio is sufficiently explicit in the method he applies to the study of the nature of the soul: scire actiones animae prius est apud nos quam scire eius substantiam. Consequently, a complete exposition of the noetic of the Brabantine master should first expose the act of intellection, then the nature of the intellectual principle required by that operation, and finally the mode of union between that intellectual principle and the body, the contribution of which was revealed to be necessary in analyzing the intellectual act. We believe that this is the order that best respects the profound orientation of the thought of Sigerio, who first of all wanted to be faithful to the principles of Aristotle, without being intimidated by the consequences that, derived from those principles, seem to contradict daily experience. Like Averroes, only after having established the nature of the intellect will Siger attempt to explain the union of that principle with each man. A good part of his doctrine is devoted to explaining how such a union takes place. But this part of his noetic, however fundamental it may be, is second in the order of demonstration. Since in this work we wish to set forth the Sigerian doctrine of the union between the single intellect and individuals, it will be necessary, if we are to be faithful to the scheme already indicated, to give us a brief panorama of the principal theses that Siger held concerning the activity and nature of the intellect. For methodological reasons we must reduce ourselves to what we call the “first Sigerian Noetic”, that is, the one exposed in his Quaestiones in tertium De anima.